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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
DECENTRALIZATION AS AN APPROACH TO MANAGE LOCAL 
PUBLIC INVESTMENT WITH A CASE STUDY OF EGYPT 
 
By 
 
Shadwa Esmat Abd-El Kader 
 
 
Decentralization is a widely used approach in the management of local 
public investment. It is argued that it helps make governments more responsive to 
the local needs, more accountable and more efficient in managing local 
investment. Despite its wide spread, it still faces some constraints in its 
applications in different countries.  
This thesis attempts to study the different forms and types of 
decentralization and how it affects the management functions of local investment. 
Then, it shall shed the light on the decentralized efforts of Egypt, and assess the 
constraints Egypt faces in its application, and provide some recommendations to 
develop the process of decentralizing management functions of local public 
investment.  
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 Introduction: 
Local investment is considered a corner stone for local economic 
development. It has gained the world attention in recent years, and has been 
affected by several conditions such as: the economic downturns associated with 
structural adjustment and political instability experienced by many countries; the 
interdependency in making investments plans between local producers, other 
economic agents as well as the government; the loss of central governments to its 
central economic coordinating role, while other actors, to make the market 
economy work, are weak; the rise in socioeconomic gaps between localities and 
regions; and the call for new roles for the public sector on both central and local 
government levels.  
Local public investment has two main roles: delivering sensitive public 
services in an effective way; foster co-operation at a broad regional level with 
private and public sector actors, to ensure that market sensitive development 
interventions are delivered in a professional and supported manner. In this sense, 
local investment plays an active role in raising living standards, creating more 
wealth and jobs, improving quality of services, and achieving distributional and 
social justice among citizens. 
The approaches used to plan, manage and finance for local public 
investment differ across countries and from region to region. This difference can 
be traced back to various elements, among which are: the difference in 
mechanisms for attracting, appraising, and managing public investment; and 
difference in political cultures in terms of appraising and accepting risk in relation 
to public sector investment as a wealth creating activity (Clark, G. and Mountford, 
D., 2007). Also, differences in economic, political, legal or administrative systems 
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 affect the approaches applied in managing local public investment.  
Despite the difference in the approaches implemented, it can be clearly 
noticed that decentralization became a world-wide trend (Kälin, W., 1999), 
whether it is an initiation of the country itself or as a result of a pressure by aid 
agencies. Decentralization is particularly widespread in developing countries for a 
variety of reasons: the advent of multiparty political systems in Africa; the 
deepening of democratization in Latin America; the transition from a command to 
a market economy in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; the need to 
improve delivery of local services to large populations in the centralized countries 
of East Asia; the challenge of ethnic and geographic diversity in South Asia, as 
well as ethnic tensions in other countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, 
Russia) and the attempt to keep centrifugal forces at bay by forging asymmetrical 
federations; and the plain and simple reality that central governments have often 
failed to provide effective public services (Litvack, J. et al, 1998). 
Therefore, this study tends to focus on decentralization as an approach to 
manage local public investment. It will assess the different types and forms of 
decentralization. It shall see how these forms affect the essential management 
functions of local public investment (planning, financing and implementation). In 
addition, it shall refer to the constraints and challenges that might be facing the 
adoption of this approach. 
 Egypt will be taken as a case study. The study shall explain the current 
Egyptian local system and where Egypt stands within the framework of 
decentralization -mainly regarding the functions of planning and financing of 
local public investment. Then, it will assess the problems and constraints facing 
the adoption of decentralization in managing local public investment in Egypt and 
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 provide some recommendations to facilitate the transition towards 
decentralization.  
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 Chapter 1: Decentralization: Conceptual Framework:  
It is evident that an extensive literature argues for the removal of central 
control over the management of local public investment. This neoclassical 
economic argument is reinforced by the growing skepticism about the capacity of 
central government bureaucracies to effectively promote equitable economic 
development.   
As a result, governments of developing countries are more seriously 
considering decentralization, especially due to the growing arguments from aid 
agencies that decentralization can help such governments address problems 
caused by the increased complexity of governance, difficulty of building 
financially and administratively effective central bureaucracies, growing demands 
for local empowerment, intractable problems of economic development, national 
dept, rising budget deficit, and growing local-level demands for goods and 
services (Cohen, J. and Peterson, S., 1999). 
It is worth mentioning that some countries still believe in giving the 
priority for managing local public investment to the central government, and some 
countries such as Norway, have shifted back again to the centralized approach, in 
what scholars named as recentralization (Magnussen, J. et al, 2007). They depend 
on arguments such as the following:  
? Lack of technical, human, and financial resources: 
This can hinder local governments from investing in and producing a 
heterogeneous range of public services that are both reasonably efficient and 
responsive to local demands (Faguet, J., 2002). 
? Territorial spillovers/ externalities: 
The activities and investment undertaken by one community can 
sometimes affect the well-being of people in other communities. If each 
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 community cares only about its own members, these externalities are overlooked, 
and accordingly resources are allocated inefficiently (Rosen, H. and Gayer, T., 
2008).  
? Local provision may fail to exploit economies of scale: 
The smallness of local jurisdictions often implies that they are below the 
critical size for cost-efficient provision of investing in public goods or services.  
? Inefficiencies due to overlapping responsibilities across government 
levels: 
The lack of clear division between the spending responsibilities of higher 
and lower-level authorities may result in an inefficient use of resources (Joumard, 
I. and Kongsrud, P., 2003).  
1-1 Arguments for Decentralization: 
Proponents of the idea that local public investment should be assigned to 
the lowest level of government i.e. decentralized, have also their arguments- 
among which are the following: 
? Response to local preferences:  
The traditional theory contends that the central government should have 
the basic responsibility for macroeconomic stabilization functions, national public 
goods, such as defense, and income redistribution in the form of assistance to the 
poor. However, a “one-size- fits-all” approach may not deliver a basket of public 
goods that is optimal for all citizens. By being closer to local citizens, sub-
national governments are, in principle, better placed to respond to their 
preferences in term of local public goods, to assess willingness to pay and to 
target services to the right people. Hence, “Pareto efficiency” could be raised – i.e. 
resources can be saved without making anyone worse off – through fiscal 
decentralization.  
? Increased government accountability: 
Since local officials can be easily identified by voters and taxpayers, they 
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 are expected to be more accountable, especially if the costs of providing public 
services are borne locally.  
? Introducing competition across jurisdictions: 
Diversity in fiscal packages offered by sub-national jurisdictions – in 
terms of quantity and quality of public goods and the associated tax burden – may 
introduce some competition across jurisdictions, and thus incentives for 
governments to raise public sector investment efficiency. Competition between 
jurisdictions relies on the assumption of mobile citizens (citizen vote with their 
feet). 
? Supply-side efficiency: 
Decentralization may allow for experimentation in the management of 
public responsibilities. In some decentralized countries, sub-national governments 
have taken the lead in designing innovative measures to increase public spending 
effectiveness (Joumard, I. and Kongsrud, P., 2003).  
? Improving management efficiency: 
Decentralization can lead to the reduction of overload and congestion in 
the channels of communications; timely reaction to unanticipated problems that 
inevitably arise during implementation; improved technical capacity to deliver 
services at the field level; improved administrative and managerial capacity; and 
improved information about local conditions for more effective and appropriate 
economic development planning and decision-making.  
1-2 Forms and Types of Decentralization: 
Several ways of classifying the forms of decentralization have been 
promoted over the past few decades, by those making a clear distinction between 
centralization and decentralization. Six main approaches identifying 
decentralization forms can be identified in the literature: 
The first approach classifies forms on the basis of historical origins. A 
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 focus on history has led some specialist to assert that there were four basic 
decentralization patterns: French, English, Soviet and Traditional. This 
classification is viewed today as simplistic and analytically weak. 
The second approach distinguishes decentralization forms by hierarchy 
and function. According to this view, territorial decentralization refers to the 
transfer of centrally produced and provided public goods and services to local-
level units in the government hierarchy of jurisdiction. Functional decentralization 
refers to the transfer of such central responsibilities to either parastatals under the 
control of the government or to units outside governmental control. This 
classification is too rudimentary to facilitate clarity over design and 
implementation. 
The third approach identifies forms of decentralization by the problem 
being addressed and the values of the investigators. It focused on studying the 
linkages of the center and the periphery on a sector-by-sector basis. The problem 
of this approach is that it is dependent on the administrative, political, economic, 
and value rationale of the analysts addressing the problem. 
The forth approach focuses on patterns of administrative structures and 
functions that are responsible for the production and provision of collective goods 
and services. The problem with this approach is that it is not analytically enough 
to deal with the increasing diversity of structural and functional designs that 
marks the last three decades. 
The fifth approach, under it, transferring responsibility, manpower, and 
resources to central government field offices is not decentralization. Rather, 
decentralization only occurs when local level government units are: established by 
legislation; located within clearly demarcated jurisdictional boundaries within 
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 which there is a sense of community and solidarity; governed by locally elected 
officials and representatives; authorized to make and enforce local ordinances 
related to devolved pubic sector tasks; authorized to collect legally earmarked 
taxes and revenues; and empowered to manage their budget, expenditure, and 
accounting systems, and hire their own employees. The approach takes a narrow 
definition of decentralization (Cohen, J. and Peterson, P., 1999). 
The sixth approach, and the most widely used by scholars and the one 
used in this paper, classifies forms of decentralization on the basis of objectives: 
Political, Administrative, Fiscal, and Market decentralization. “Political 
decentralization” aims to give citizens and their elected representatives more 
power in public decision-making. It is often associated with pluralistic politics 
and representative government, but it can also support democratization by giving 
citizens or their representatives more influence in formulating and implementing 
policies. “Administrative decentralization” seeks to redistribute authority, 
responsibility, and financial resources for providing public services among 
different levels of government. It is the transfer of responsibility for planning, 
financing, and managing certain public functions from the central government and 
its agencies to field units of government agencies, subordinate units or levels of 
government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, or area-wide, 
regional, or functional authorities. Administrative decentralization has three major 
forms: deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. “Fiscal decentralization” 
stresses upon the fact that financial responsibility is a core component of 
decentralization. If local governments and private organizations are to carry out 
decentralized functions effectively, they must have adequate revenues -raised 
locally or transferred from the central government- as well as the authority to 
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 make expenditure decisions. Fiscal decentralization can take many forms 
including: Self-financing or cost recovery through user charges; Co-financing or 
co-production, in which users participate in providing services and infrastructure 
through monetary or labor contributions; Expansion of local revenues through 
property or sales taxes or indirect charges;  Intergovernmental transfers of 
general revenues from taxes collected by the central government to local 
governments for general or specific uses; Authorization of municipal borrowing 
and mobilization of national or local government resources through loan 
guarantees. “Market decentralization”: the most complete forms of 
decentralization from a government's perspective are privatization and 
deregulation; they shift responsibility for functions from the public to the private 
sector. They allow functions that had been primarily or exclusively the 
responsibility of government to be carried out by businesses, community groups, 
cooperatives, private voluntary associations, and other nongovernmental 
organizations. Privatization and deregulation are usually accompanied by 
economic liberalization and market development policies (Litvack, J. and Seddon, 
J., 1999).   
Decentralization can be either horizontal or vertical. Horizontal 
decentralization disperses power among institutions at the same level, while 
vertical decentralization, which is more useful, allows some of the powers of a 
central government to be delegated downwards to lower tiers of authority (Hope, 
K., 2000).  
Since our main concern here is the management process of public 
investment at the local level, the paper will focus on administrative 
decentralization and its impact on local investment management process. 
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 Administrative decentralization: has been defined as: the “transfer of 
responsibility for planning, management, and the raising and allocation of 
resources from the central government and its agencies to field units of 
government agencies, subordinate units or levels of governments, semi-
autonomous public authorities or corporations, area-wide regional or functional 
authorities or non-governmental private or voluntary organizations” (Rondinelli, 
D. and Nellis, J., 1986).  
The literature often differentiates between three major types of 
administrative decentralization: deconcentration; delegation; and devolution. 
There are also two other types -top-down principal agency, bottom-up principal 
agency- that are important since they identify real situations which are not 
captured by the other three. In addition, the probability of the coexistence of more 
than one type of administrative decentralization, has led scholars to call it 
“hybrid”.   
1-2-1 Administrative decentralization: 
1-2-1-1 Deconcentration: 
It is the passing-down of selective administrative functions to lower 
levels or subnational units within central government ministries. Deconcentration 
is the least extensive form of decentralization. Although it does result in some 
dispersal of power, few decisions can be taken without reference to the centre 
(Hope, K., 2000). Cohen and Peterson (1999) had defined it as the transfer of 
authority over specified decision-making, financial, and management functions by 
administrative means to different levels under the jurisdictional authority of the 
central government. It involves ministries retaining power over key tasks at the 
center while transferring the implementation roles related to such tasks to staff 
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 located in ministerial field offices. In such systems, local governments exist as 
discrete ministry offices – not as discrete entities- and without any mechanisms at 
the local level for mandatory horizontal integration. Deconcentration is the most 
common form of decentralization employed in agriculture services, primary 
education, and preventive health.  
The Criteria for deconcentrating authority within various departments or 
other organizations of central government are similar, but not exactly the same, as 
for delegating to districts assemblies as principal agents. The one significant 
difference is that activities for which local governments are not likely to be 
assigned responsibility during the foreseeable future, but which do meet the other 
requirements of principal agency, should be deconcentrated in order to relieve 
local government of the burdens of implementations (Silverman, J., 1992).  
1-2-1-2 Delegation: 
Delegation is the transfer of specific authority and decision-making 
powers to organizations that are outside the regular bureaucratic structure and that 
are only indirectly controlled by the central government, such as parastatals and 
semi-autonomous agencies. In this type of decentralization, the central 
government retains the right to overturn local decisions and can, at any time, take 
these powers back (Hope, K., 2000). In other words, it is the transfer of 
government decision-making and administrative authority for clearly defined 
tasks to organizations or firms that are either under its indirect control or are 
independent. Mostly, it is done by central government to semi-autonomous 
organizations, not wholly controlled by central government but legally 
accountable to it (Cohen, J., and Peterson, S., 1999). The semi-autonomous 
government agencies are assigned the responsibility for implementing or 
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 maintaining sector investments. Such arrangements occur primarily in the energy, 
communication, ports and transport sectors.  
The Criteria for delegation to parastatals, special districts or project 
management units vary somehow depending on the type of organization to which 
responsibilities are delegated. 
Criteria for delegation to any type of organization include: 
• Requirements are technical and capital, rather than labor intensive; and 
• Do not require significant supporting actions by other agencies of 
government. 
Criteria particular to one or another type of organizations: 
Parastatals: 
• The range of activities are focused on the delivery of a single, discrete 
service, or very limited range of discrete services; and 
• The activities to be performed are of a commercial or quasi-commercial 
nature, but are considered public goods by virtue of tending towards 
natural monopoly. 
Special districts: 
• The range of activities are focused on the delivery of a single, discrete 
service, or very limited range of discrete services; and they are of a 
commercial or quasi-commercial nature (as in the case of other 
parastatals); but 
• Efficient and effective delivery of services require location-specific 
decision-making because the area served has relatively unique 
characteristics; and 
• Such unique characteristics do not conform to the administrative 
boundaries of any of the more ordinary administrative boundaries of 
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 government (e.g. local governments) 
Project Management Units: 
They are limited to functions which are performed on a temporary basis 
and are not expected to be performed beyond the life of the project (Silverman, J., 
1992). 
1-2-1-3 Devolution: 
It occurs when authority is transferred by central governments to 
autonomous local-level governmental units holding corporate status granted under 
state legislation. In devolved systems, responsibilities for a range of operations 
encompassing more than one sector are assigned to local governments. To the 
extent that local governments have discretionary authority, they can do essentially 
what they decide to do; bind only by: broad national policy guidelines; their own 
financial, human, and material capacities; and the physical environment within 
which they must operate. The exercise of discretion by local governments 
depends to a significant extent on their ability to generate the financial and staff 
resources to implement the decisions which they themselves make. The role of 
central government here is limited to ensuring that local governments operate 
within very broad national policy guidelines, with respect to those functions for 
which local government have the authority to exercise discretion.  
In these devolved systems, project implementing agencies are responsible 
to local governments rather than to sector ministries. The management of projects 
is integrated within the established structure of local governments (centralized 
management at the local government level) or autonomy is granted to project-
specific management units (delegation or deconcentration of management to 
project managers by local government).  
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 The Criteria for devolution: Consideration could be given to devolving 
discretionary authority for planning and implementing projects and on-going 
operations which: 
• Require location-specific decision-making because the area served by the 
project has relatively unique characteristics in terms of  impact on project 
implementation and subsequent operations; 
• Do not have significant consequences for priority objectives of the country 
as a whole; 
• Have relatively low economies of scale as compared to implementation or 
operation on a country-wide scale; 
• Are labor-intensive, rather than technical and capital intensive; 
• Require close integration of activities across sectors within a limited 
geographical area encompassed within established local jurisdictions; 
• Desire or require local participation; 
• Are relatively small scale; 
• Can be easily contracted out to the private sector for technical design. 
Implementation, and operations; and/or  
• Do not require significant supporting actions by other agencies of 
government, either at high levels or among semi-autonomous corporations 
(Silverman, J., 1992). 
1-2-1-4 Top-Down Principal Agency: 
When acting as principal agents, local governments exercise 
responsibility on behalf of central governments or parastatals, and they do so 
under the direction and supervision of central government agencies. Depending on 
the degree of autonomy local governments have -with respect to their other 
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 functions- they can act as principal agents in two ways: they can do so in their 
entirety and be no more than complete principal agents of central governments or 
they can serve as principal agents in parallel with their performance of other 
responsibilities.  
The Criteria for Top-Down Principal Agency: Consideration could be 
given to assigning responsibilities to local governments as Principal Agents for 
projects and operations which: 
• Have significant consequences for priority objectives of the country as a 
whole; 
• Require some location-specific adaptation to somewhat unique features of 
the environment within which project implementation and/or subsequent 
operations will need to take place; 
• Have relatively medium-range economies of scale as compared to 
implementation or operation on either a strictly local or country-wide 
scale; 
• Are relatively small-scale and labor intensive, but require significant 
levels of technical, logistical, and/or managerial backup and support; 
• Are more easily contracted-out to the private sector at local levels than 
would be the case at national or regional level; and/or 
• Involve activities which local governments do not now have the capacity 
to implement but for which it is desired they develop such capacity so as 
to serve as discretionary authorities in future (Silverman, J., 1992). 
1-2-1-5 Bottom-Up Principal Agency: 
It is the opposite of the top-down model. In this situation, various levels 
of government or government parastatals act as agents of lower levels of 
 15
 governments or directly as agents of beneficiaries or clients. The source of the 
discretionary authority is reversed. As is the case with the top–down principal 
agency model, the fundamental characteristics of the bottom–up principal agency 
model also do not depend on the extent to which local governments are, or are not, 
subordinate to higher levels of government with respect to other functions they 
might perform (Silverman, J., 1992).  
The Criteria for Bottom-Up Principal Agency at Community Level: 
Consideration could be given to assigning responsibilities to governments as 
Principal Agents of beneficiaries/ clients/ users for services which: 
• Require community level location-specific decision-making because the 
area served has relatively unique characteristics in terms of service 
requirements; 
• Do not have significant consequences for priority objectives of the country 
as a whole; 
• Require local participation, as determined by a community’s population 
itself; and 
• Are not capital intensive; but 
• Have relatively high economies of scale; and 
• Do require supporting actions by other agencies of government or the 
private sector because of significant technical requirements in the design, 
implementation, or operation of the activity (Silverman, J., 1992). 
1-2-1-6 Hybrid Decentralization: 
In practice, it is not easily to assess the impact of decentralization on 
investment programs or projects only in terms of those five types of 
decentralization. Most system-wide institutional arrangements are characterized 
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 by the coexistence of elements of at least four of those forms of decentralization, 
together with other highly centralized government functions. Such systems will be 
referred to as “hybrid” (Silverman, J., 1992).  
Within hybrid systems, some functions are decentralized in one way and 
other functions are decentralized in other ways. For instance, one common form 
of hybrid system results when governments assign responsibility for financing and 
supervising investment projects to local government, while retaining 
responsibility for planning investments, technical staff employment and career 
advancement, as well as technical support, in central sector ministries.  
Honadle and Gow (1981) suggested that effective decentralization 
strategies must be based on mutually supportive relationships between central and 
subnational governments. Several comparative studies of local organizations 
found that the nature of these links between authorities, representing smaller and 
larger communities, was central to the successful operation of the smaller units. 
The center must maintain responsibilities for performing functions for which it 
has comparative advantage while giving field personnel the autonomy and 
resources to demonstrate their capabilities. Such approach requires both strong 
linkages and shared responsibility between the center and periphery. It is 
important to focus on the linkages among organizations horizontally and 
vertically within the entire system, rather than on internal efficiencies within local 
governments or individual parastatals or specialized agencies. In other words, 
focusing should be on the entire decentralized system rather than limiting 
attention to local governments themselves.  
1-3 Managing local public investment in decentralized 
governance: 
 17
 The management responsibility of local investment became a multi-actor, 
multi-sector and multi-level. It is multi-actor where its success depends on its 
ability to mobilize public, private and nonprofit actors. It is multi-sector, which 
refers to public, private and community sectors of the economy. It is multi-level, 
both national and international due to the impact of global changes. Actors 
include: Local government; National Governments; Development agencies, 
development banks, and special regional funds; International financial 
institutions; Foundations and NGOs; Commercial banks and investment 
institutions. 
The theory and the principles imbedded in the normative literature on 
assignments of investment and service responsibilities suggest that a sector is a 
prime candidate for decentralization if: 
• Local demands for a service differ across localities; 
• There are no substantial economies of scale associated with the service; 
• There are no substantial spillovers of costs or benefits from the service; 
• The service is amenable to at least partial local financing through taxes or 
charges; 
• Local governments have the capacity to deliver the service; 
• The service is not meant to provide substantial redistribution of income or 
wealth. 
However, the institutional analysis literature suggests that it is not 
possible to declare, a priori, that certain services should always or never be 
decentralized. Sectoral decentralization policies should review the nature of the 
service and the situation of local governments to determine if conditions are 
conducive for decentralization (Andrews, M., and Schroeder, L., 2003).  
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 Decentralizing services also do not have to be uniform across all local 
governments in a country. There may be different service requirements in 
different locations; for example, urban versus rural municipalities. Likewise, 
perceived differences in the technical and administrative capacities of local 
governments can result in differential assignments of investment and service 
responsibilities. 
Notwithstanding, It is essential to clearly determine which functions in 
which sub-sectors ought to be delegated to which organizations or to be 
deconcentrated or be devolved to which level of government. Some functions are 
clearly national in scope and responsibilities for them ought to be retained by 
central governments. 
However, it is important to distinguish first between the “providing” 
functions of public goods and the “producing” functions, since it helps to identify 
the types of management functions which ought to be maintained and improved 
by each party to the management process. Provision is the decision to and actual 
allocation of resources to a particular good or service and monitoring of its use. 
Production is the transformation of those resources into the delivery of those 
goods or services. It is axiomatic that governments are responsible for the 
provision of public good; although it is not necessarily involved in producing 
them.  
If government agrees to limit its role to the provision of public goods and 
services, the decisions that they focus on shall be: what types of public goods and 
services ought to be financed by the public sector? How the production of such 
public goods and services ought to be financed? What is the quantity and quality 
of such goods and services? How and by whom such goods and services ought to 
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 be produced? What is the type of regulation which ought to be applied to private 
sector production of such goods and services? How the production of such goods 
and services will be monitored? 
To exercise those responsibilities for the provision of local public 
investment, the government has to understand and determine its role with regard 
to the following functions: planning, financing, and implementing of local 
investment projects.  
1-3-1 Planning of local investment: 
Planning can be defined as “a continuous process which involves 
decisions or choices about alternative ways of using available resources with the 
aim of achieving particular goals at some time in the future” (Conyers, D. and 
Hills, P., 1984). 
 The establishment of investment planning is clearly essential for 
provision. Through the planning functions, decisions are made concerning what 
goods and services will be provided by the public sector and the quantity and 
quality of those goods and services. Governments need to plan to arrive at rational 
financial and allocation decisions based on clear goals settings, sufficient 
information, and sound analysis. 
To plan for investment projects, the government has to consider both 
short-term and long-term objectives. In the short term, the efficient and effective 
implementations of a project’s initial investment activities are the primary 
objectives. In the long-term, longer term sustainability of benefits is the ultimate 
objective. 
Till the mid 1960s, countries were more pre-occupied with macro-
economic growth opportunities and laid great emphasis on large-scale investment 
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 projects. Planning was concentrated at the top and tended to be more focused 
more on strategies of development than on actual potentialities and means of 
implementation. This left a wide gap between the plan and the ground realities. In 
this context, it becomes clear that planning -to be more effective- has to share 
appropriately decision-making functions with sub-national levels through a 
system that is properly adapted to the needs and characteristics of the country 
involved, and covering the range of regional and local conditions.  
This implies “multilevel planning”, which involves sharing of planning 
and policy functions at different sub-national levels and devising mechanisms and 
procedures for effective flows of information for planning and interaction between 
and among the sub-national levels. Attempting this kind of planning would 
involve: decentralization of planning to several discrete sub-national levels and 
planning for specific sector investments that must fully consider the broader 
cross-sectoral investment priorities established at the national level; organizing a 
two-way planning process; building up of capabilities to plan and implement 
functions at each one of the decision-making levels; managing planning with 
people’s participation (Sundaram, K., 1997). 
The project design/planning function within developing countries has 
most been performed by one or some combination of the following: ministries of 
planning, sectoral ministries or other specialized agencies, specialized project 
planning units; and donor agencies responsible for financing a particular project.  
Ministries of planning have been assigned responsibility for project 
investment feasibility studies and final approval of plans especially in countries 
with centrally planned economies. In such cases, sectoral ministries, or project-
specific management units have usually been responsible for more detailed 
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 implementation planning.  
This approach has led to many problems such as: diversion of planning 
bodies from appropriate focus on strategic planning to detailed project planning; 
planning ministries staff are normally less familiar with operational realities faced 
by implementing agencies or with the needs and desires of beneficiaries.  
In a decentralized system, investment planning must be enhanced. Since 
sectoral ministries at the national headquarter level often suffer from inadequate 
information about location-specific conditions and priorities of potential 
beneficiaries, it is suggested that one of two alternatives be initiated: a vertically 
linked deconcentrated planning system within each sectoral ministry or a system 
which devolves particular planning responsibilities to state and local governments, 
perhaps with technical support provided by sectoral ministries (Silverman, J., 
1992). 
Without efficient planning, the investment process is condemned to 
failure. For the planning process to be efficient at the local level, according to 
Ioannis S. Vavouras (1986), it should include the following activities:  
• Identification of the existing and forecasted social needs of the locality. 
• Specification of the socioeconomic objectives of the local community. 
• Formulation of priorities with respect to objectives. 
• Identification of the alternative investment projects for the advancement of 
local objectives. 
• Determination of the fair rate of return on capital, the planning horizon, 
and the financial, technical, institutional and other constraints. 
• Financial analysis of the alternative projects and rejection of financially 
non-viable projects.  
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 K.V Sundaram (1997) had identified various actions that are required for 
an effective multilevel planning as follows: 
• Determining the critical area levels in the country to which planning and 
decision-making functions in the particular sector of activity under 
consideration could be decentralized. 
• Defining the appropriate planning and decision-making functions against 
each area level, so that there are no overlaps in planning among the 
various area levels. 
• Matching planning functions with adequate allocation of financial 
resources to the various area levels, so as to enable the performance of 
those functions in an effective manner. 
• Equipping the area levels with properly staffed planning machinery to 
perform the designated planning and decision-making functions. 
• Training the planning personnel in the tasks of multilevel planning. 
• Building up a suitable database and information system at the critical area 
levels to support the planning and decision-making activities. 
• Establishing suitable organizational structures for coordination as part of 
the overall mechanism for planning devised at the various area levels. 
• Establishing linkages- downwards (i.e. sector/component projects linkage), 
horizontal (i.e. sector-sector linkage) and vertical (i.e. sectoral hierarchy 
linkage) linkages for integrated development.  
• Establishing an effective two-way communication network through 
hierarchal, expert group, status group and friendship group consultations 
for rapid exchange of information. 
• Instituting regular flows of information, top-down (for policies/priorities, 
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 targets, guidelines, finances, reviews, evaluation, etc) and bottom-up (for 
data on local needs, feedback on the implementation of projects and local 
levels perception relating to problems and constraints, etc). 
• Delegating various administrative powers and authority to the lower levels 
to enable as well as quicken the decision-making process at these levels. 
• Organizing monitoring on a decentralized basis with evaluation being 
centralized at appropriate levels. 
• Organizing participation at various levels through formal and informal 
methods so that the needs and aspiration of the people are duly taken note 
of in the planning process. 
1-3-2 Financing of local Investment: 
One of the main arguments for decentralization, as previously mentioned, 
is the expectation that local governments can be more efficient and effective than 
central governments in raising revenue. This was based on the belief that officials 
in close proximity to those who are required to pay taxes and users’ fees, will 
result in increased ease of enforcing revenue regulations. In addition, willingness 
of taxpayers and users of public sector services to pay local governments shall be 
greater, assuming that local governments have greater legitimacy and more 
responsive to citizen preferences when deciding on local investment and recurrent 
expenditures. 
Revenue sources play a key role in influencing local government 
spending behavior and investment decision. To be “optimal”, financing patterns 
should meet several, sometimes conflicting, objectives. On the one hand, local 
governments may better respond to local citizens’ preferences where local 
taxation allows spending to be matched with costs. On the other hand, the need to 
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 smooth volatile local tax revenues, efficiency of tax collection, minimization of 
compliance costs often argues in favor of some co-ordination/centralization of 
taxing powers (Joumard, I. and Kongsrud, P., 2003). In practice, sub-national 
governments rely on very different mixes of resources, which are mainly: taxes, 
user-charges, borrowing, from government production or sale of goods or services, 
and intergovernmental grants.  
Local Taxes are considered the main source of revenue for local 
government expenditures, mainly property taxes, income taxes, sales and excise 
taxes, and business taxes. The autonomy local governments are granted to set tax 
bases and rates varies significantly across countries. In some cases, sub-national 
government tax revenues derive mostly from tax-sharing arrangements, whereby 
sub-national governments receive a share of the taxes collected within their 
jurisdiction, or nationwide, but have virtually no right to set tax parameters 
(Joumard, I. and Kongsrud, P., 2003). 
User fees and Charges refer to prices charged by local governments for 
specific services or privileges used to pay for all or part of the cost of providing 
those services. User fees, normally account for a marginal percentage of local 
revenues. To the degree that the incentive framework shifts from reliance on 
central government subsidies to self-financing by local governments, user fees can 
be expected to assume lager importance (Fisher, R., 1987). Nevertheless, further 
reliance on user fees and charges by sub-national governments faces two main 
constraints. First, increasing sub-national government reliance on user charges 
may raise equity concerns, especially where applied to core goods and services 
(namely education, health care and social assistance). Sub-national governments 
are frequently bound by legal constraints in setting the level of charges. Second, 
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 user charging is an attractive option only if the implementation costs are lower 
than the expected efficiency gains. Implementation costs are also likely to reflect 
scale economies and thus be high in the smallest jurisdictions. There is a trade-off 
between implementation costs and efficiency gains from user-charging (Joumard, 
I. and Kongsrud, P., 2003). 
Local governments borrow money - by selling bonds- for three primary 
purposes: to finance capital projects, to support and subsidize capital investment 
by private individuals and businesses, and to provide cash flow for short term 
spending or for special projects.  
Local government may generate revenue by becoming the monopoly 
producer of a good or service and then charging prices that are greater than costs 
for that good or service (Fisher, R., 1987).  
Intergovernmental grants are transfers of funds from one government to 
another, most often from a higher-level government to lower-level governments. 
Grants may be used to correct for externalities that arise from the structure of 
subnational governments and improve the efficiency of fiscal decisions. It can 
also be used for explicit redistribution of resources among regions or localities, 
and can be considered as a macroeconomic stabilizing mechanism for the 
subnational government sectors (Fisher, R., 1987). Central government transfer is 
considered an unstable source of revenue for subnational governments because of 
frequent changes in the decisions of central government officials. On the other 
hand, financing local investment by central governments can create disincentives 
for the generation of local revenues. As subnational governments have become 
increasingly dependant on central governments grants, it is more rational for them 
to devote time and energy for lobbying central government than for establishing 
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 and implementing systems for local revenue generation (Silverman, J., 1992). 
These expenditures and financing measures are often used to indicate the 
type of decentralization within countries. The share of subnational governments in 
total public spending is understood to show their importance as provider of 
services, while the extent to which they are self-financing is supposed to reveal 
their degree of decision-making autonomy. However, these are only partial 
indicators. Discretion over spending and taxing does not necessarily follow from 
access to certain proportion of national resources. Conversely, the proportion of 
local funds coming from central resources does not invariably imply that local 
autonomy is reduced, although it does so more often than not (Silverman, J., 
1992).  
The main problem facing local government in this area is the “fiscal gap” 
between their spending responsibilities and their revenue-sharing powers. Since 
taxation represents the main source of revenue for local government, by looking at 
its structure, it is found that in some countries, local governments have been 
granted increased autonomy to set tax base or tax rates, while in many other 
countries effective taxing powers have been restricted. The increasing “fiscal gap” 
seemingly conflicts with the traditional view that the benefits from fiscal 
decentralization arise when the costs of providing local public goods are borne 
locally. However, this may reflect an unavoidable tension between proliferating 
local spending demands and a scarcity of tax instruments with the correct 
characteristics for being levied locally (Joumard, I. and Kongsrud, P., 2003).  
Therefore, Stefan Bach and Dieter Vesper (2002) believed that the core 
for local government finance reform and for efficient implementation of 
investment projects must be to strengthen the financial position of local 
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 authorities by increasing their tax revenue. Higher revenues are essential to 
improve their ability to invest. At the same time, tax revenues to the local 
authorities should be made less vulnerable to cyclical fluctuations, to enable the 
local authorities to fulfill their local tasks more steadily. If they had more income, 
they would have more scope to perform voluntary self-administration tasks.  
Richard Murphy (2005) provided some recommendations to improve the 
management of local finance system, as being the most fatal function affecting the 
whole management process. Some of related recommendations were:    
• Local government must be given back the confidence and means to control 
their capital expenditure budgets and how they finance them. 
• Unless local authorities have the freedom to control their revenue, they 
will never have sufficient funds to make appropriate choices on new 
capital spending or investment projects. 
• Great care should be taken to ensure that local authorities receive both the 
financial and technical help they need from central government and the 
private sector to apply for commercial finance. 
• Central government capital and revenue grants to local authorities should 
continue with a particular emphasis on ensuring that no authority is denied 
access to capital spending because of its inability to raise the necessary 
finance from its local population. 
 1-3-3 Implementation of local investment: 
The ultimate measure of the success of project implementation is the 
sustainability of efficient and effective operations over the long-run, and that is a 
function of recurrent operation and maintenance (O&M). The effective 
performance of O&M function depends on: the appropriate design of initial 
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 project implementation arrangements; recurrent cost requirements, incentives for 
performance; and availability of required capacity.  
With respect to “Project implementation arrangements”, there is a trade-
off between short-term project implementation efficiencies and post-project 
effectiveness. The concern for sustaining project benefits through effectively 
institutionalized subnational arrangements mostly are not assigned a weight equal 
to that assigned to shorter term project implementation efficiencies. Therefore, 
methods for providing sufficient linkages between those responsible for one phase 
and those responsible for subsequent phases must be established during the 
upstream project implementation phase and should be explicitly addressed during 
investment planning process.  
In many countries, ministries at the central level are responsible for all 
decisions concerning the location, design, construction and major rehabilitation of 
large-scale infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, responsibility for providing and 
actually performing post-project O&M is often assigned to provincial or local 
governments. (A more indirect influence from central government occurs when 
direct grants provided to local governments can be used only for capital 
investment, which in turn results in a subsequent obligation by local government 
to provide recurrent O&M from their own locally generated resources).  
In a devolved system, financial self-sufficiency is an essential component 
of discretionary decision-making at local levels. For this to be realized, two 
requirements must be met: recurrent obligations resulting from centrally mandated 
or financed investments do not reach levels which totally absorb reasonable levels 
of locally-generated revenue; and local governments have the interest and 
capacity to calculate the recurrent cost implications of their own investments and 
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 those made by others on their behalf (Silverman, J., 1992).  
Isabelle Joumard and Per Mathis Kongsrud (2003) suggested new 
approaches to manage the implementation of local investment explained as 
follows:  
? Amalgamations: 
Merging sub-national governments is one option to exploit scale 
economies and internalize spillovers. Amalgamations can also help to reduce the 
duplication of tasks, in particular administrative ones, and to balance intra-
regional disparities in income levels with the needs of public services (in 
particular between city centers and suburban areas). Recent mergers have led to 
fewer authorities of larger size in a number of countries (including Belgium, 
Canada, Iceland, Netherlands and Sweden). The upper government tier often 
contributes financially to improve the attractiveness of amalgamation (Finland, 
Japan, Norway, and some cantons in Switzerland), as it may benefit from lower 
costs at a local level through the grant system. However, what may be considered 
appropriate policy for urban areas may not help much in dispersed rural 
communities when the delivery of high quality public investment and services is 
an important tool used for regional development objectives. Optimal boundaries 
also vary significantly between different public services (e.g. water management 
versus health care provision), implying that the redefinition of borders will never 
lead to an “optimal area” division for service provision. Amalgamations often 
meet fierce political resistance, due to vested interests or because sharing taxes 
and expenditures in a new and larger entity almost inevitably produces winners 
and losers. 
Designing an asymmetric assignment of spending responsibilities could 
be an option, by transferring spending responsibilities only to jurisdictions with a 
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 critical mass and/or sufficient human and technical knowledge. In practice, 
however, few countries have used such an asymmetric assignment, mostly for 
political or geographical reasons. 
? Co-operation agreements across and between levels of government: 
Ad-hoc co-operation agreements among levels of government have 
increasingly been used to achieve “optimal” functional areas specific to each 
public service. 
There are two broad approaches to such co-operation. The first relies on a 
purchaser/provider split. The supply of public services is concentrated in some 
jurisdictions, which receives some compensation from other jurisdictions 
benefiting from the services. This approach has been implemented in Denmark 
and Sweden for hospital care where patients have a legal right to choose hospital 
treatment outside their county of residence. Such a co-operative approach based 
on a purchaser/provider split can also be extended between levels of governments 
when spending responsibilities overlap.  
Apart from allowing the exploitation of scale economies and the 
internalizing of spillover effects, this approach has the advantage of introducing 
some competition between providers of public-funded services, whether public or 
private, inducing greater cost-efficiency. 
The joint provision of public services, through jurisdiction associations, 
has been another form of co-operation. In some countries, such co-operation 
arrangements have been encouraged by the government. In Hungary for instance, 
the central government promotes joint service supply organizations created by 
municipalities. 
There are two main constraints for the co-operative arrangements to 
develop further. First, it requires appropriate and transparent cost accounting – 
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 which in many cases is not available in the smallest jurisdictions – so as to set the 
financial compensation for the “buying” jurisdictions at a “fair” level. This has led 
the Swiss confederation to set up a model contract, containing minimal standards 
with respect to cost transparency, rights and obligations of the partners, and 
overall democratic accountability. Second, it may be difficult to apply to public 
services which are non-rival and non-excludable since free riding could not be 
discouraged. 
1-4 Constraints and challenges facing decentralized management 
of local public investment: 
The current trends of managing local public investment through 
decentralization face some constraints. Matthew Andrews and Larry Schroeder 
(2003) presented intergovernmental and bureaucratic politics and capacity 
constraints and timing as main constraints. 
? Intergovernmental politics:  
It influences decentralization as national politicians attempt to maintain 
central control over crucial service provision components, notably fiscal resource 
management and implementation and construction of service access points. 
National politicians generally exhibit a desire to maintain their influence over 
local public services and investment because: they are highly visible to political 
constituencies; they provide important opportunities for donor funding. In 
addition, for them, decentralization can create political threats. 
? Bureaucratic politics: 
National level bureaucracies attempt to ensure that crucial components 
related to service provision, especially construction and resource management, are 
centralized. In some instances these components are centralized in legal processes. 
Where legislation decentralizes them, other bureaucratic behaviors limit 
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 localization, including informal process requirements and direct forms of inter-
organizational conflict. 
Procedural requirements, whether legislated or informal, limit the 
operational authority of local entities and complicate procurement and personnel 
management. 
Inter-organizational conflict arising from clashing rule structures also 
thwarts decentralization initiatives. 
? Local level capacity: 
Central bureaucrats and politicians regularly excuse continued 
involvement in local level provision because of capacity limitations at local 
government level. The argument is simply that financial management, project 
implementation, construction and planning have to be centralized because of poor 
local capacity. 
It is commonly held that decentralization requires local level managerial 
and technical capacity, particularly planning, operations and maintenance. 
A second aspect of capacity involves institutional abilities for 
intergovernmental coordination. Such coordination devices facilitate provision of 
different service components at different levels of government. Most central 
agencies have systems and procedures conducive to effective control and internal 
coordination but not external organizations. Without such capacity, central 
governments have no way of organizing the different components across 
government levels, resulting in a tendency to keep them all in-house. This is 
experienced in many services, but particularly health care and education. Service 
provision in these areas requires the coordination of a variety of components 
across levels, which can be difficult to achieve. 
A third aspect of capacity pertains to fiscal management. Effective 
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 decentralized service provision requires an adequate level of local governance, 
including legal and financial capacity. This requirement extends to both monetary 
resources, i.e. a fiscal base sufficient to ensure funding for maintenance and 
operations, and personnel and process, i.e. appropriate staff and systems for 
managing the money. Where these capacities are limited locally, fiscal 
management tends to be centralized. 
? Timing: 
‘Timing’ constitutes another issue that can help explain a divergence 
between statutory decentralization and reality. Responsibilities are often not fully 
devolved either because the initiative has not reached that part of its plan or 
because it tried to devolve responsibilities before intergovernmental structures or 
local capacities were in place. Either slow or rapid implementation can also be 
used to sabotage the process. 
Vito Tanzi (2001) added other constraints in front of decentralization, 
among which were: 
? Corruption: 
A few years ago, papers by Prud’homme and Tanzi advanced the 
hypothesis that decentralization could lead to more corruption. This hypothesis 
has led to a growing literature debating the issue or attempting to test it. So far, no 
broad consensus has emerged, some supported it and others rejected it. The reason 
for hypothesizing a positive relationship between decentralization and corruption 
is that in many countries local institutions are less developed than national ones. 
As a consequence, their ability to control abuses of power by public employees 
and officials is more limited than at the national level. Many factors can account 
for this difference in the quality of institutions at the national and subnational 
levels. For one thing, the brightest and best-trained people tend to join the national 
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 government where their career prospects and salaries tend to be higher; national 
governments are therefore more likely to be able to create more transparent and 
accountable public administrations. Furthermore, foreign technical assistance 
from international institutions and industrial countries is generally provided to the 
national governments of developing countries and not to the local governments. 
In countries such as Australia, Canada, Germany, and the United States, 
the educational level of the population is so high that highly trained people are 
available for all levels of government and good institutions can be created by all 
jurisdictions. In many poor, developing countries, however, the best and most 
talented people, if they go into public service at all, join the national government. 
The quality of the subnational institutions and of their staffs thus tends to be lower. 
Lower salaries, fewer prospects for advancement, regulations, and greater 
contiguity of employees and citizens create conditions that increase the 
probability that poorer governance will be more common at the subnational level. 
Casual observation suggests that corruption is also more widespread at the 
subnational level. Even in the United States, cases of explicit corruption have 
been reported over the years in local governments, but rarely at the national level.  
? Fiscal Transparency: 
Transparency has gained attention because of the belief that markets and 
governments operate much better and more efficiently when they have sufficient, 
good, and clear information. It is obviously more difficult to provide clear and 
sufficient information when the subnational jurisdictions are fiscally important 
and operate independently from the national government. Quite apart from the 
difficulties in understanding the nature of their operations—a problem that also 
exists often at the national level—subnational governments rarely generate and 
publish good data on a timely basis, and the lack of complete or timely statistical 
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 information complicates the conduct of fiscal policy and the analysis of public 
sector operations.  
In brief, it is worth noting that despite the need to decentralize local 
public investment responsibilities in order to improve efficiency, consideration 
must be given to some factors such as the significant inter-jurisdictional spillovers, 
substantial economies of scale, major income redistribution goals or insufficient 
local government capacity. At the same time it is not possible to declare that 
certain services or projects should always or never be decentralized. Since 
provision and production responsibilities are separable, investment 
responsibilities should be considered on a component-by-component basis. 
However, Success is not guaranteed, and the process of decentralization is 
considerably more complex than simply declaring that a sector is ‘decentralized’. 
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 Chapter 2: Local public investment in Egypt: towards a 
decentralized process: 
2-1 Egypt: Background Information:  
Egypt is one of the oldest societies in the world and is also one of the 
largest and most densely populated of the Arab countries (with over 1,000,000 
square kilometers of land, and with about 80 million people). Much of the land in 
Egypt is desert and only 6 percent of the area is inhabited (El-Sahart, S., et al, 
2005).  
With the rapidly growing population, limited arable land, and dependence 
on the Nile, all continue to stress the society. The Egyptian government keeps 
struggling to meet the demands of Egypt's growing population through economic 
reform and massive investment. 
The Nile River in Egypt imposed the emergence of one of the first 
centralized states in history. The central government’s priority in Egypt, 
throughout its history, has been to ensure a productive distribution of irrigation 
water among regions. This priority enforced the successive central governments to 
establish local administration systems to guarantee the effectiveness of water 
distribution. In addition, the state’s military and civil bureaucracy developed to 
administer, protect, and exploit agricultural production and surplus across Egypt’s 
regions. Thus, the Nile River has been the basis of the centralized state in Egypt.  
Any weakness in the state was often associated with local rebels’ attempts to 
break from the central government and even to establish their own independent 
systems of government.  
The fact that Egypt was colonized throughout its history contributes to the 
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 centralized state in Egypt. The successive colonization powers, Roman, Byzantine, 
Arab, Mamluk, Ottoman, French, and British, had mostly preferred to rule Egypt 
through a centralized system.  
The changes in the nature of the economy and the society after the country’s 
independence in 1952 did not eradicate the centralized nature of the public 
administration system in Egypt. The socialist policies adopted by the successive 
governments starting from the middle of the 1950s until the end of 1960s, under 
the rule of President Nasser, strengthened the role of the state in administering 
both the economy and the society. The growing role of the state deepened the 
centralized nature of the Egyptian regime, in general, and the local administration 
system in particular.  
The semi-liberal economic policies that Egypt has shifted to since 1975, 
under the rule of President Sadat and President Mubarak, were not associated with 
a parallel package of liberal social and political reforms. The combination of 
semi-liberal economic policies and non-liberal social and political policies 
maintains the centralized nature of the state and its local administration system 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The reason is that the burden of service 
provision is still in the hand of central government that has not shifted it either to 
the market or to the local units. Even when the government left little role for civil 
society organizations, especially not-for-profit organizations, it kept them 
regulated by laws and unified under the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs. 
Egypt has a republic multi-party political system with a ruling political 
party, the National Democratic Party (NDP) that dominates the political and 
economic environment. There are minority parties but they are extremely small, in 
terms of the number of their representatives in the legislative and executive 
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 entities at the central and local levels, and they play limited roles in the political 
process in Egypt. The president is the head of state, specifically the head of the 
executive power that dominates the political life in Egypt.  
The prime minister, who is appointed by the President, runs the 
government’s day-to-day operations for the domains other than national security 
ones, mainly defense, security, and foreign policy. The NDP, which is the only 
source of political recruitment at the center and local levels, plays a key role in the 
formation and conduct of government. The main legislative body in Egypt is the 
People’s Assembly, which is directly elected by the people (Amin, 2005).  
2-2 Local Administration System in Egypt: 
According to 2004 United Nations Human Development Report, the 
current administrative system in Egypt represents one of the most centralized 
systems in the world. While a large spectrum of services is devolved to local 
authorities in most countries, all services in Egypt such as water distribution and 
sewage, education, health, energy distribution, garbage collection, and even parks, 
are run centrally. Provision of services is executed locally but the central 
government maintains a strong grip and control over the finance and the 
administrative systems by which local services are provided (UNDP/INP, 2004).  
One should distinguish between the "administrative system" in general 
and the "local administrative" system in particular. In the Egyptian terminology 
and practice, the term "administrative system" refers to, or more properly includes 
three branches as follows: First: Public Administration, which is the central 
apparatus of ministries (i.e. ministerial offices in the capital) and other central 
authorities and agencies (e.g. the Central Agency for Public Mobility and 
Statistics "CAPMAS", and the Central Authority for Organization and 
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 Administration "CAOA"..). Second: Public Enterprises Administration, emerging 
through the process of privatizing public sector projects and adopting a market-
oriented management style. Many of these projects is still owned by the state, 
however its legal and organizational status has been reformed by the law 203 / 
1991, so that the projects are gathered in seventeen big holding companies with 
various affiliates, and are directed by free handed managers responsible before a 
general assembly consisting of both officials and professional experts. Third: 
Local Administration, which refers to the local units' structures and functions (EL 
Sawy, A., 2002). 
2-2-1 Legal and Institutional framework of local Administration system: 
Egyptian local administration rests on two legal foundations: the 
Constitution and Law 43 (1979), as amended. The Constitution refers to local 
administration as the third branch of the executive authority of the government, 
after the president of the state and the government. It includes one broadly written 
article, Article 27, plus three subsequent Articles:  
Article 27: Beneficiaries shall participate in the management of the 
services of projects of public interest and their supervision in accordance with the 
law. 
Article 161: The Arab Republic of Egypt is divided into administrative 
units enjoying legal personality, which are governorates, cities, and villages, and 
other administrative units may be established if the public interest so requires. 
Article 162: Local Popular Councils are to be formed through direct 
election, providing that at least half of its members are from workers and peasants. 
The law warrants the gradual transfer of authority to them. 
Article 163: The law shall describe the method of formation of Local 
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 Popular Councils, their jurisdiction, financial resources, their relations with the 
People’s Assembly, their role in preparation and execution of development plans, 
and their control over various activities. 
The constitution’s way of referring to local administration has led some 
experts to conclude that the permissive nature of the language provides Egypt the 
room to undertake decentralization without the need for a constitutional change.  
According to the law 43/1979, local communities are enrolled in a five 
tier system of local administration as follows: 
1) Governorate: the governorate is the main service delivery unit of 
subcentral Egypt. It may be simple and fully urban (as Alexandria, Cairo, 
Suez and Port Said) or complex consisting of one or more urban and rural 
communities. This distinction is reflected in the lower levels, i.e. simple/ 
fully urban Governorates have no Markaz, since the Markaz is a sort of 
conglomeration of villages. Moreover, Governorates may be composed of 
one city, like in the two cases of Cairo and Alexandria. Hence, these one-
city-Governorates are solely divided into Districts (i.e. urban 
neighborhoods). Cairo consists of twenty-three Districts; Alexandria 
consists of six Districts. 
2) Markaz: The Markaz is the next unit in the hierarchy below the 
governorate. It includes a capital city of the Markaz, other cities if existing, 
and a group of villages. It functions as the center for its constituents units. 
Before 1975, the Markaz was essentially an area division for functionally 
proper management of state activities (e.g. security purposes and 
registration for military service...). Now, each of the 166 Markazes has an 
autonomous legal status as a local unit, supervising the lower villages. 
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 3) City: The City exists in all Governorates: as a one-city-Governorate, as 
the capital of a Governorate, the capital of a Markaz, or as a constituent 
city in a Markaz. Moreover, a City may be recognized with a special status 
enacted by a special law, i.e. the City of Luxor, by the law No.9/1989. 
Cities are divided into Districts if functionally necessary. There are over 
200 Cities. 
4) District: The District is the smallest local unit in urban communities. 
However, Districts differ from one Governorate to another in terms of size, 
population and political and economic circumstances. Districts in Cairo 
and Alexandria come on the higher-ranking Districts in Egypt, i.e. the two 
are the political and economic capitals respectively. Districts used to be 
further divided into sub-Districts or sections or neighborhoods called 
Sheyakha, which served as a smaller area division adequate for efficient 
service delivery, and to facilitate district management. 
5) Village: The Village is the smallest local unit in rural communities. 
However, Villages differ from each other in terms of the legal status. There 
are two types: villages that are considered local units (mostly the larger 
ones) and the smaller “satellite villages”. Satellite villages, which are not 
considered local government units and thus have no public sector service 
role in the local administration system, and are included in the jurisdiction 
of the closer Markaz. Moreover, these satellite villages are further divided 
into sub-village neighborhoods, called Hessa (portions), e.g. Kafr, Ezba, 
Nagei...etc. In every satellite or sub-village, where there is no police 
station, there should be an Omda (Mayor). The Minister of Interior since 
late 1994 appoints mayors. They are mainly responsible for keeping 
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 security and resolving social and land conflicts, irrigation matters and the 
like (EL Sawy, A., 2002). 
In brief, the local administration system in Egypt can be classified in 
three levels for simple governorates and four levels for complex governorates. For 
simple governorate, the three levels are governorate, city and districts. For 
complex governorate, the four levels are governorate, markaz, city and village, 
and district (figure. 1).  
Egyptian Local Administration 
Central Authority 
Governorate Governorate 
 
Figure 1- Egyptian Local Administration 
2-2-2 Authority and Administration: 
Each basic unit includes an executive officer, staff, and two councils. All 
local administration officers are appointed by and serve at the pleasure of, the 
appointing authority—the governor by the president; the chief of the markaz by 
(Complex/Rural and Urban)
Markaz 
(Simple/Completely Urban)
City City Village 
District District 
Sections Satellite Village 
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 the prime minister, city and district chiefs by the minister of local development, 
and the village chief by the governor. This is often a consultative process—for 
example, the Minister of Local Development typically nominates the governor 
and the governor is then consulted on the ministry’s appointment of city and 
district chiefs. However, the mix of appointments creates incentives for 
intergovernmental conflict rather than cooperation among the sub-central 
government administrators since they are ultimately accountable to different 
officials in Cairo.  
Each local administration unit operates with two councils: the 
constitutionally established Elected People’s Council (EPC) and a centrally 
appointed Local Executive Council. Of the two, the power lies almost entirely 
with the appointed council, which is composed of government administrators 
from the line (central) ministries or the ministry directorates. The EPCs are 
directly elected every four years, and at least half of the members must be workers 
and peasants. The council members elect the EPC heads. Although the EPCs have 
been legally assigned functions, the reality is that they have very limited power, 
lacking any meaningful role in the preparation of the budgets of the jurisdictions 
they represent. Moreover, not only are EPC members legally prohibited from 
interrogating members of the local Executive Council, but also the language of 
Law 43 (amended) sends a clear message of the EPCs’ fiscal policy powerlessness 
by using words in reference to the EPCs such as “supervise” and “follow up” 
rather than “provide” or “produce.” An exception is a provision for a Local 
Services and Development Accounts (LSDA) that gives the EPCs and the 
governor the right to establish certain non-tax revenue accounts for activities such 
as housing, land reclamation, and industrial support. 
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 The members of local Executive Councils are government administrators 
representing line (central) ministries and the ministry directorates. For example, at 
the governorate level, the council is headed by the governor and has in its 
membership the governor’s assistants, the chiefs of the markaz, cities, districts, or 
urban administrative quarters, the heads of service directorates, and the authorities 
operating within the governorate. The secretary general of the governorate serves 
as the secretary general of the Executive Council as well. Similarly, the appointed 
chief executive officers of the markaz, city, district and village local government 
units are heads of the Executive Councils in their jurisdictions. Local Executive 
Council responsibilities include preparing the budget, assessing the performance 
of local administration projects and services, outlining the rules in the 
administrative and executive branches in their local activities, and setting the 
guidelines for managing and investing the governorate’s real estate assets (Amin, 
K., and Ebel, R., 2006).  
2-2-3 Analysis of local system: 
A quick look at the administrative system in Egypt, one can notice that 
the local system combines representative and administrative functions. For 
example, each local unit should be governed through the collaboration of a local 
people’s council and a local executive council. The major function of both is to 
better implement public policies at local level. However, the People’s Councils 
play a political and cultural role, that is to say, community representation and 
participation in local affairs. Executive councils play two roles: representing the 
central government and implementing popular councils' recommendations, where 
not contradictory with public policies. 
In the conduct of their work, Local units fall under a complex control grid, 
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 both from outside and inside the administrative system. The external control 
comes from the center: Governors are appointed by a presidential decree; the 
parliament issues local administration laws, and its members can attend and 
discuss any matter in local people’s councils; the media -especially the press- and 
more specifically the opposition's press- has an increasing influence on local units 
so that Governors are usually alert to what is published about them and their 
Governorates, and assign some of the personnel to react effectively; the Cabinet 
issues and regulates services' charges and dissolves local popular councils; the 
Prime Minister issues the executive regulations of the local administration laws, 
approves Governorates' bank loans, and substitutes any local unit if its 
performance is considered unsatisfactory; the Minister of Local Administration 
monitors the performance of local units and submits a yearly report to the 
parliament, resolves conflicts among local popular and executive councils, and 
redistributes the money of the Joint Revenue Fund. 
The internal control is reflected in the administrative hierarchy of the 
local system. For example, higher executive and popular levels control the 
activities of the lower ones (e.g. approving the decisions, investigating officials, 
monitoring performance...). The presence of a system of checks and balances 
between executive and popular councils (e.g. the latter monitor the activities of 
the local executives through demanding explanations and raising questions; and 
the chief executives can veto/ ignore popular councils' recommendations, 
claiming them to be irrelevant, or being outside the jurisdiction of the local unit) 
(EL Sawy, A., 2002). 
In brief, the current local administration system in Egypt has the 
following major characteristics: (1) centralization, (2) complexity, (3) instability 
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 and irrational change, (4) the dominance of appointed entities over elected entities, 
(5) lack of accountability mechanisms, and (6) lack of institutional capacity 
(Amin, 2005). 
2-2-4 Egyptian Local administration system and Decentralization: 
In the light of the previously described local administration system in 
Egypt, an important question is to be raised in this context: where the Egyptian 
system fits under decentralization forms? 
Fox and Ghanem (1998) described the Egyptian local administration 
system as “deconcentrated”. They argued that: First, the Executive Councils, 
which are appointed by the central government, have the real and effective powers 
and authorities, especially at the governorate level. The Governorate Executive 
Council prepares the governorate budget (which is consolidated to include all 
districts, cities and villages in the governorate) and sets rules for management of 
executive agencies, investment in governorate lands and buildings, and housing 
and physical planning. Its members control all service delivery in the governorate. 
Second, the District Executive Councils prepare budgets for all cities and villages, 
provide technical services and resources to cities and villages, coordinate city and 
village projects, implement projects in cases where the cities or villages fail, and 
identify projects that serve more than one local unit. Third, expenditure 
responsibilities, as detailed by the Executive Regulation, are all delegated to the 
central government, even when the services are purely local in nature. Fourth, the 
Peoples' Councils only have the powers to approve or disapprove, suggest, 
recommend, and follow-up, within the bounds of State public policy. The 
Councils may even be left out of decisions, such as often occurs because of delays 
in the budget setting process. Fifth, higher Peoples' Councils supervise lower 
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 Peoples' Councils, and can veto their decisions. Finally, though the Peoples' 
Councils have a free hand in using their financial and real assets, they are limited 
by the requirement that the governor approve their actions.  
Khaled Z. Amin and Robert D. Ebel (2006) also saw that Egypt can be 
best described as having “administrative deconcentration without authority”. 
Not only do elected EPCs have very limited say in local administration spending 
and tax decisions, but even the administrative head of the governorate, the 
primary local service delivery unit, has very circumscribed powers. For example, 
although the Minister of Planning may issue a decree to invest to the appointed 
governors with the power to choose among investments, in the end the decision is 
still made by the line ministry (diwan) where the power resides. 
2-3 Assignment of local public investment functions within the 
approach of decentralization:  
2-3-1 Planning: 
The designed investment projects are identified through two channels: 
central and local. Central ministries prepare their own investment plans, which 
will be achieved at local levels. Projects of the social services, health and 
education in particular are more centrally planned; local units follow and monitor. 
For example, when the Ministry of Education plans to build some new schools, it 
allocates and includes them into the Governorates' plans. So, the Governorates' 
education directorates are responsible for technical matters (e.g. school system, 
staffing...); while the local units are responsible for allocating the land, 
supervising the construction, following up and maintaining the infrastructure and 
services, etc. It may happen, however, that centrally planned projects are not very 
favored by the local units, especially by members of popular councils, who prefer 
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 to have fully local-made plans relevant to their community needs, which they 
know better (EL Sawy, A., 2002). 
The national investment plan places a series of restrictions. Fox and 
Ghanem (1998) referred to some of these restrictions as follows: 
? The plan is the basis for all laws and decisions being made by public 
authorities. Thus, the budget, as a law, must be taken from the plan 
? Provisions of the plan have priority over other public laws 
? The annual goals of the plan are binding on the State's general budget 
? Investment obligations cannot be made in violation of the plan 
? Approval by the Ministry of Economic Development "MOED" (known 
previously as Ministry of Planning "MOP") is required on most financial 
activities. 
On the other hand, the governorate directorate for planning assists in 
investment planning activities. Its specific activities include: 
? Communicating the essence of the State's public policy and outlining the 
development plan to the local units. 
? Cooperating with the other concerned ministry directorates in studying 
projects that are submitted by local units, and coordinating and integrating 
the various sectors in preparing draft plans and referring them to the 
governorate Peoples' Council. 
? Supervising and following up the execution of the approved local plan 
? Assisting local units and their agencies in finding proper solutions for the 
problems facing the execution of the plan. 
? Reporting monthly to the Governorate Peoples' Council and to the 
governor about the results of follow up and inspections. 
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 In general, local planning is expected to help achieve the best use of 
available resources, to discover new opportunities inside each local unit, and to 
suggest a distribution of available resources in accordance with local priorities. 
However, in Egypt, the purpose of local planning is not to give local units the 
initiative and final voice in their plans. Evidence that local units have no deciding 
voice in the preparation of the investment and current budgets is that budgets are 
centrally prepared and decided upon. The local units only suggest proposals of 
local needs according to previously prepared priorities (figure. 2). The roles do 
not serve to build local capacity or to ensure that local priorities are met. The 
conception of a local plan is one-sided, as indicated by Article 118 of Law No. 43 
of 1979 which states: "The local unit is to determine its needs according to well 
prepared priorities. It is to accumulate these needs and co-ordinate them in a draft 
local plan to be approved by the concerned local Peoples' Council, and transmit 
them to the governorate Peoples Council "(Fox and Ghanem, 1998). 
 
Figure 2 – Planning cycle at local level 
(Source: Ali EL Sawy, 2002) 
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 Egypt applies a top-down approach in the conduct of investment planning, 
and still the center decides what and where project to be executed, regardless of 
the real needs of local units. And the process goes as follows as presented by 
Samir Abd.El-Hamed, and Fared Ahmed (2006): 
? The political authority determines the goals and the size of investment, 
and distributes these investment projects on different sectors (agriculture, 
industrial, transport…) according to the role of each sector in achieving 
the goals.  
? The departments of Ministry of Economic Development distribute the 
investment projects on different sectors according to centrally decided 
aggregate/overall number. 
? The departments of regional planning geographically distribute these 
investment projects, and inform regions and governorates with their 
specified investments. 
? At the same time, local units prepare a proposal of the suggested 
investment projects.  
? The governorates’ planned projects go to the Ministry of Economic 
Development which is responsible for the harmonization between those 
proposals and the state’s general plan. However, the central ministries 
have the final word.  
In brief, the process of planning for local investment goes as follows: The 
MOED office for each governorate informs governorate units of the instructions 
and guidelines concerning the annual investment plan and appears to have some 
role in assessing local needs. This is to ensure that local projects are tailored to the 
priorities of the National Plan. The governorate executive council puts the draft 
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 investment plan together and submits it to the elected local council for its 
approval. Governorate plans are then forwarded to the MOED for review and 
consolidation and the preparation of the investment chapter of the budget. 
For some directorates (such as water resources and irrigation and land 
reclamation) the investment chapter allocations are held at the ministry level 
because many such projects cross governorate boundaries. In such cases, apart 
from being consulted on these larger projects, the governorate may also propose 
minor local projects, such as repair of a local irrigation channel. (Shand, D., 2005). 
It thus becomes evident that governorates and local unit do not have an 
influential role in planning for investment. The process is still very centralized, 
despite the governments’ declared efforts of moving towards decentralization and 
giving local units a greater say in the determination of projects more demanded by 
their communities.  
2-3-2 Financing: 
There are two main sources for finance in the existing local system: the 
major one is governmental subsidies or grants, constituting around 80% of the 
resources; and the other is additional/ local funding, mainly through Special 
Funds. Most of the investment budgets are financed through transfers. About two 
thirds of total finance comes from the National Investment Bank (NIB). Foreign 
donors contribute about 8 percent of funds for local investment (Fox and Ghanem, 
1998). 
It is worth noting that local budgets are an integral part of the State 
general budget and requires the approval of the national legislature. This approval 
is required for the entire budget, and not only for governmental subsidies and 
grants-in-aid.  
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 The budgets of all lower local units plus the governorate level offices are 
incorporated into a single governorate budget. The governorate finance directorate 
prepares the consolidated draft budget for the governorate and all of its local units. 
The Governor is supposed to present the draft budget to the governorate Peoples' 
Council for discussion and approval at least four months before the beginning of 
the fiscal year. However, delays in completion of the Ministry of Finance’s annual 
guidelines and in budget preparation often cause the budget to be sent forward 
without approval of the People’s Council. The Governor then negotiates the 
consolidated budget with the General Secretariat for Local Administration. The 
final proposed budget (for all governorates) is sent to both the Ministry of 
Economic Development and the Ministry of Finance and an additional round of 
negotiations occurs. The governor’s major potential contribution lies in his ability 
to negotiate a better than average increase in expenditures. 
The Local People’s Councils have little influence on the budget, other 
than their often ignored advisory role. The Peoples' Councils have no authority to 
set local taxes, fees and duties, and again, can only propose revenue sources. They 
are required to approve the annual investment plan. However, they have no right 
to interrogate officials about the budget, which limits their ability to scrutinize and 
comment on it (Shand, D., 2005).  
The financing system of local investment faces many difficulties as a 
consequence of the problems facing local financing system in general. These 
involve:  
? Lack of funds, which makes fund-raising a major concern of local councils 
and also gives greater power to the executive branch of the system. 
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 ? A major source of finance for local units and the Ministry of Local 
Development "MOLD" (known previously as Ministry of Local 
Administration "MOLA") has been the Joint Revenues Account of 
Governorates. Half of the amount goes into the budgets of the 
Governorates where the import-export, movable properties, industrial and 
commercial taxes were collected. Thus, Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said and 
Aswan Governorates get together some 30% of the amount. The other half 
goes to the MOLD, to be used in local developmental projects especially 
in deprived Governorates. Yet, the Ministry of Finance approves the 
MOLD's use of money on the condition that the Ministry of Economic 
Development gives prior approval for the MOLD's projects. Governorates 
should submit their proposals for local developmental projects in 
accordance with the national plan directives. Thus, it appears that the 
Ministry of Finance has traditionally discouraged the creation of a 
budgetary system at the local level that would be independent of the 
central government's overall plans. However, a great deal depends on the 
negotiating powers of a governor and the weight of support he is receiving 
from the Minister of Local Administration. 
? The central government and line ministries, as well as the governor and 
Governorate financial directorate, play important roles in the budgetary 
process. The more a governor is development-oriented and committed to 
decentralization, the more he allows for cooperation between local 
institutions (appointed and elected) and motivates popular council to raise 
funds locally and to activate community participation, instead of being 
greatly dependent on or clients of the central government. Yet, the 
 54
 complicated budgetary process also stands in the way of an ambitious and 
energetic outlook of a governor (making some of them less enthusiastic for 
recalling for decentralization; others taking politically miscalculated risks 
and thus facing a critical situation with the central government).  
? As for locally chosen projects, a complex legal structure and fiscal 
regulations constrain local investment finance. Until 1991 the National 
Investment Bank (NIB) imbursed the total money specified for 
Governorates' budgets as a lump sum; now the imbursement is allowed in 
four quarters, i.e. every three months. To receive their allocated money, 
Governorates should submit necessary financial documents of expenditure 
proving that they have already spent the previous lump properly, i.e. 
according the approved budget. Yet, starting project implementation, i.e. 
contracting, requires that the local unit have the money already. Hence, the 
problem is two-fold: First, the imbursement procedures usually take time, 
perhaps up to three months, following the legal and bureaucratic 
regulations in designing and doing the bidding, etc., especially for bigger 
projects, and preparing contracts and other documents to be submitted to 
the NIB. Second, the NIB, in its turn, follows complicated regulations to 
approve the documents and imburse money to Governorates, and specifies 
deadline time for them to use it. The result is that Governorates may 
receive the money short before the specified period is over, after which 
money can not be imbursed, or until the end of the financial year, after 
which the unused money is returned to the national treasury. Most of local 
units can not, therefore, fully accomplish the yearly-approved projects in 
their plans. (As for the unachieved projects, most of them are practically 
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 included in the next year plans - as "projects under completion"- or the 
executive leader (e.g. Governors) try to finance them through the Local 
Development Fund, or remain uncompleted for some longer time)(EL 
Sawy, A., 2002).  
? The local administration share of national investment spending by sector is 
based on Egypt’s Five-Year Plan for Social and Economic Development. 
Here the problem of the data link between a deconcentrated and a more 
functionally decentralized system becomes particularly apparent: the plan 
of (2002/03 through 2006/07) shows an allocation of just 1.7 percent of 
total investments for local works (table 1) The reason behind is that the 
bulk of investment funds are allocated directly to the central service 
ministries, so capital spending is tucked away in line ministry budgets. 
Thus, one cannot conclude that there is no local investment action in the 
development sectors of education, health, and housing or the major 
income-generating sectors of construction, industry, commerce, and 
agriculture (table 2). As Egypt decentralizes, one of the new institutional 
capacities to be developed will be a decentralized system of data collection 
and monitoring (Amin, K. and Ebel, R., 2006).  
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Table 1 – Local administration share of national investments by sector 
Source: Ministry of Economic Development, 2005. 
 
Table 2 – Local administration current expenditure distribution by sector & region 
Source: The Peoples’ Assembly.  
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 ? Each year, the MOED reviews investment proposals from different 
agencies and Ministries to determine the budget. The MOED may also 
propose investment projects of its own accord since it is responsible for 
drafting and implementing the Five-Year Plan (FYP) in line with Article 
114 of the Constitution. The NIB, in turn, is responsible for screening the 
proposed projects and supervising implementation, if approved. 
Significant changes in the project funds require approval from MOED. 
The MOED’s criteria for evaluating the merits of different projects require 
strengthening and better specification with clear ex-ante guidelines, 
including cost-benefit analyses. The primary rule for approval and 
incorporation of an investment project in the FYP appears to be its 
fulfillment of investment targets identified in the Plan. This would avoid 
the impression that program assessment and fund disbursements could be 
susceptible to discretionary allocations and, possibly even, political 
considerations (UNDP/INP, 2004).  
? Ministries are the bodies responsible for investing in public services in 
different governorates. The MOLD only receives investments for the 
maintenance and/or expansion of the administrative functions of local 
government. Since no Governorate is free to allocate investment funds to a 
particular priority project, there is little real room for ‘local choices’ in the 
delivery of national policies. Without some budgetary discretion, local 
actors can hardly realize significant welfare, let alone any economic gains 
(Weisner, 2003). In addition to local government finances through the 
general government budget, local governments are allowed under the law 
to maintain special accounts and funds outside the framework of the 
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 national budget. These accounts represent an additional source of revenues 
for local government levels that supplement their fiscal resources. While 
local government revenue (including revenue from funds and special 
accounts) accounted for five percent of total government revenue in 
2001/2, special accounts represented almost 30 percent of local 
government revenue, with transfers from the NIB accounting for a similar 
share. Yet more often than not, these funds are used to complement central 
government expenditure on local investment projects. This means that 
governorates often give up the limited degree of financial independence 
that the funds grant them in order to complete investment projects – a 
trend which would be reversed if MOED would integrate local 
government so as to identify local investment needs adequately 
(UNDP/INP, 2004).  
To conclude, on the expenditures side, the level of autonomy of local 
government to make investment decisions is restricted by central government. 
Only 15 percent of aggregate investment of expenditures is conducted at the local 
government level, and the allocation of the bulk of aggregate investment is 
directed to the local level by decisions made by the MOED and line ministries, 
according to MOED’s Five Year Plan and priorities. Thus, even the autonomy for 
each governorate to execute this expenditure is almost nonexistent. Wages are 
determined centrally by the number of workers in public services in each 
governorate -the approval of new projects requires additional workers. On the 
other hand, the allocation of investment expenditures in total local government 
expenditures is limited to only 8 percent of local government expenditures and is 
primarily for the maintenance cost of MOLD units. 
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 In addition, governors have lost the authority to transfer budget 
allocations from one budget chapter to another. Within the same chapter, such as 
the investment budget chapter, the governorate cannot shift funds allocated from 
one investment project to another, that is, from a hospital to a school for example, 
these being under the investment budgets of two different ministries). Meanwhile, 
the Minister of Local Government can transfer allocations from one governorate 
to another without referring to the governor. 
The Ministry of Economic Development has announced that starting with 
FY 2005/06, it will take a step toward deconcentration with authority by assigning 
16.7 percent (LE 2.09 billion) of public investment to the governorates to manage 
based on their preferences and priorities (Amin, K. and Ebel, R., 2006). However, 
more real steps towards devolution, rather than only delegation of authority, is 
needed for Egypt.  
2-4 Why Egypt needs decentralization in managing local public 
investment? 
Centralization of management functions of local public investment does 
not appear to be working in Egypt. The quality of public services is missing. This 
means that a considerable share of public resources is being wasted as those 
expenditures fail to provide the basic services citizens need and expect to get. 
(EDI and PADCO, 2005) 
Under the current situation, local government is discouraged from raising 
funds, as these are appropriated by the central government (According to an 
amendment of Law 43/1979, added in 1988: “local councils cannot raise revenues 
or create other sources of revenue collection without Cabinet permission”). Thus, 
by allowing local government to retain higher shares of certain taxes would 
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 provide an incentive at the local level not only to collect the taxes but also to 
support the private sector and promote economic activity and diversification in 
each governorate (Weisener, 2003). Therefore, applying decentralization should 
mean better planning and allocation of resources so as to reduce uncertainty at the 
local level (UNDP/INP, 2004).  
Beyond those impacts, not decentralizing management functions of local 
investment in Egypt will mean to forego other positive benefits associated with 
decentralization. Decentralizing investment-planning and implementation could 
generate projects that are of highest priority for the poor in any region. A 
decentralized body “in comparison to national governments is more accessible, 
more sympathetic and quicker to respond to local needs”. On a local level, 
programs and projects can be more easily adapted to particular local 
circumstances and needs. This is so because local authorities are obviously more 
knowledgeable about a local situation than central authorities who are far away 
from realities at the grass-root level. As a result, the necessary information to plan 
such programs and projects is more readily available and the chances of success 
are consequently higher. 
 It will also allow the Egyptian local communities to share in the costs 
through mobilization of local resources and allowing more accountability in 
project implementation and operations. The close relationship between citizens 
and government at the local level fosters accountability since the decision-making 
that is close to the people is a good instrument to prevent governments from 
abusing their powers. This is because firstly, it is more difficult to hide corruption 
among those in authority when the citizens know the officials than in situations 
where “the Government” is far away and inaccessible. Secondly, it is easier to 
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 hold local officials and elected office-bearers accountable for their actions than it 
is to impose accountability on politicians at higher levels of government, as 
members of local governments are often less protected politically than the 
corresponding official in the central government. 
 Also, the transfer of spending decisions to local levels helps address the 
problems of investment mal-distribution and misuse of resources. Both the 
availability of information necessary for taking proper actions and the potentially 
higher degree of accountability will lead to a better use of available resources. 
This will allow doing more with limited resources. Government resources can be 
allocated most efficiently if responsibility for each type of public expenditure is 
given to the level of government that most closely represents the beneficiaries of 
these outlays. 
One of main strategic goals of the Egyptian government is achieving 
economic development including local development. Development is possible 
without decentralization of local investment projects management, however, the 
advantages of strong local governments for a more efficient administration just 
outlined above also help to improve local development projects. Decentralization 
shall remove institutional and legal obstacles to self-help encourage innovative 
forms of solutions for local problems. By letting the local people determine how a 
particular program should be designed, involvement of the local government 
enhances the sense of ownership and responsibility for the project. The citizens 
are therefore more likely to invest their time and resources into furthering the 
project’s goals. This in turn helps to produce better results than if the development 
activities were decided upon from the distance of the central government. In 
addition, local government may make development activities more sustainable by 
 62
 involving the people affected more directly in the implementation of projects. The 
ability to help in the early planning phases of a development project in turn 
encourages the local population to carefully monitor and protect the results of the 
planning (Kälin, W., 1999)  
Local governments have the potential to perform better; however, one 
must remember that better administration is not an automatic result of 
decentralization. Still, if local governments are properly equipped to fulfill their 
tasks, the chances for achieving “better government” through decentralization 
increase.  
Decentralization need not, and usually does not, occur evenly across the 
board. That is, implementation will be asymmetric. Depending on a variety of 
political, economic, and institutional and organizational realities, different areas or 
service sectors may be treated differently (Bird and Ebel, 2006). Therefore, Egypt 
can choose the approach that best fits with its own circumstances, within the 
framework and general guidelines experienced by other countries.  
2-5 Problems and Constraints facing the decentralized 
management of local investment: 
The current Egyptian local administration system faces many problems 
that constraint the decentralizing process of local public investment management. 
Among these problems are: 
Separation between Expenditures and Revenues: No correlation exists 
between local current revenues raised as part of the State budget and the ability of 
local governments to spend through the budget. This has several perverse effects. 
The expenditures available to a local government depend on their historical level 
and the ability of the governor to negotiate for more. Political skill rather than 
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 service demands and needs become the driving force for additional spending. On 
the one hand, every local unit has a strong incentive to argue for the maximum 
revenues possible, since there is no local cost. Not surprisingly, the People’s 
Councils consistently seek much larger budgets than they receive. However, the 
governor and other administrators are responsible to central authorities, not the 
local people, and their incentive may be to keep the budget relatively small. 
Indeed, their incentives may be to under-spend the budget allocations. In addition, 
accountability by service providers is to the central government rather than to the 
local population. The criteria used for evaluating success are more likely to be the 
ability to follow bureaucratic rules and to control costs rather than to provide 
quality services that people demand. 
Separation between Current Expenditures and Investments: 
Numerous ministries and agencies are involved in aspects of local government 
finance. The Ministry of Finance makes decisions on budgets for the governorate 
directorates and the line Ministries together with the Ministry of Finance decide 
on budgets for local teachers, health workers and so forth. The Ministry of 
Economic Development, operating somewhat independently, makes investment 
decisions as part of the five year plan. The Social Fund for Development and the 
General Secretariat for Local Government also make grants and loan for 
investment purposes. 
The overall system is very poorly coordinated. The governor is 
responsible for coordinating the planning directorate with the line ministry 
directorates, but neither the governor nor the directorate heads control budgets 
and expenditures. The five year plan provides general coordination for investment 
resources, though the different granting agencies do not coordinate between 
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 themselves. As a result, it is very possible for a new school to be constructed with 
no resources having been allocated for operational purposes (Fox and Ghanem, 
1998).  
Central government control over budgeting for local projects: 
Although, in theory, each popular council is supposed to develop a draft budget, 
the reality is different. A popular council does give a great input to the draft 
budget that is eventually sent forward to the higher level of administration; but 
most of these inputs which go beyond the initial guidelines stipulated by the 
ministerial representatives in the Governorates (i.e. sectorial directorates) are 
quietly ignored at the central government level (EL Sawy, A., 2002). 
Confused Lines of Authority: All local administration officers are 
appointed by and serve at the pleasure of, the appointing authority. This mix of 
appointments – as previously mentioned- creates incentives for intergovernmental 
conflict rather than cooperation among the subcentral government administrators 
since they are ultimately accountable to different officials in Cairo (Amin, K. and 
Ebel, R., 2006). At the same time, governors have relatively little direct control, 
despite their role as the chief official in the governorate. The system causes 
employees, who are already reticent to take initiative, to be particularly 
conservative about doing anything unusual. Local consumers are disadvantaged 
by the system since it is difficult for them to identify who is responsible for 
service delivery. The governor is likely to be the focal point for many complaints 
despite his inability to directly control delivery (Fox and Ghanem, 1998). 
Inadequate local capacities: It is argued that lower administrative levels 
are frequently lacking the necessary capacities to perform new functions. There is 
a need for stronger control systems to assess performance and to prevent 
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 corruption in each sector, along with training and capacity building of local 
officials as well as members of elected People’s Councils. For example, in 
education, an institutional change via decentralization, introduced without 
timetable and guidelines for personnel training and salary structure, curriculum 
reform, methods of providing teaching material and equipment would have 
limited positive effect on academic achievement. Capacity building would be 
costly and could take time. Ideally, capacity building should start immediately and 
in parallel with decentralization efforts.  
In brief, the highly central administration of planning, financing and 
expenditure has reduced cost effectiveness and accountability of local 
administration units, as well as impacted on the quality of the process of planning, 
execution and follow-up of the central authorities. Thus, fiscal management of 
local development has remained almost entirely from the center. Under the 
2003/04 State Budget, for example, the government and its authorities manage LE 
11.8 billion in investment under Budget Chapter Three, while local administration 
units combined manage only LE 1.7 billion (UNDP/INP, 2004).  
This has led to a state of dependency by local communities on the 
government, and has diverted the attention of local citizens away from local 
institutional structures; they turn instead to central government to solve their 
financial and other problems. Only the center is perceived able to provide 
financial resources, to implement local development plans or to monitor the 
performance of the local administration units themselves. In its most notorious 
form, this dependency is expressed in the perception that parliamentary elections 
and elected representatives are basically channels for requesting services from the 
central government. 
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 2-6 Recommendations/Action plan to adopt decentralization in 
managing local investment: 
Well designed decentralization is not a zero sum process. Where 
decentralization is well designed, nations are wealthier, grow faster, and are more 
stable than nations with centralized systems (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2003). 
Designing a decentralized system to manage local investment achieves a 
major shift in development and implies reducing the powers and jurisdictions of 
upper levels in the government and increasing the powers and jurisdictions of 
lower and local levels. It means changing the power structure as a means to move 
the development of Egypt as a whole to a higher level of equilibrium, as the 
historical constraints that inhibit its development are removed. 
Decentralization implies transferring the authority to regional 
governorates and other lower local entities to set local priorities and plans, 
mobilize local resources and implement and control local investment projects. 
Central ministries and organizations should limit their focus to broad plans, 
strategies and policies, setting national standards, controlling and regulating these 
standards, and on providing incentives to governorates to implement national 
programs. They should also have an impact on the local plans, policies, and 
programs through an incentive structure composed of financial resources and 
management of standards and benchmarks. The center should support local 
entities to create strategic plans, and monitor the implementation of such plans 
and their outcome. 
Therefore, Egypt has to gradually develop and implement a strategy 
towards the real adoption of decentralization as an approach to manage local 
public investment. The decentralization strategy shall deal with the previously 
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 mentioned problems and constraints. This can be dealt with as follows:  
To deal with the “Separation between Expenditures and Revenues”: 
? The bottom-up approach resulting from the adoption of decentralization 
will render the tasks of managing local public investment easier by 
breaking up the monolithic bureaucracy which is difficult to manage or 
hold accountable from Cairo. And this means that accountability shall be 
to the local people to ensure good quality, and not to the bureaucratic rules.   
? The governor is in the best position to debate priorities and arbitrate 
among members of his constituency. Once the governor has become an 
elected position, his authority should no longer be disputed except by his 
constituency and he should be insulated from the bureaucracy at the center 
which currently acts to hamper local initiative and local public/private 
partnerships. 
To deal with the constraint of “Separation between Current 
Expenditures and Investments”: 
? Coordination of planning for investment expenditure is essential, taking 
demographic projections and urban planning as the basis for special and 
functional distribution of capital budget allocation at the governorate level. 
Decentralization allows for making good investment plans, since it 
involves the people who are directly affected by the planned projects. 
? At the local level, elected Popular Councils should be in a position to 
represent community preferences in full knowledge of the budget envelope, 
costs and benefits of each project and time frames involved. 
To deal with the constraint of “Central government control over 
budgeting for local projects”: 
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 ? The transfer of considerable authority to local government over a 
transition period should be subject to continued conditions of fiscal 
neutrality: The allocation of the investment budget across governorates 
should no longer be decided behind closed doors at the center. Coherent 
and transparent rules should dictate the size of the capital budget 
transferred to each governorate according to the size of its population, the 
volume of its resources and the magnitude of the gap in its human 
development index. This would mean that the geographical coverage of 
the Safety Net Program will improve if resources were allocated according 
to size of population in each governorate/ district (WB, 2004). 
? Local government should have the right to collect and retain certain taxes 
that are internationally recognized as principally spent on community 
services such as land and real estate taxes as well and at least part of the 
sales and excise taxes. They should also be provided with incentives to 
administer and improve on collection of corporate and income taxes, as 
well as the authority to retain a portion with which they spend locally so as 
to further promote economic activity and employment in their region. 
(UNDP/INP, 2004). 
? Local governments would also be responsible for financing their 
investment projects. Local government revenues would come from a 
combination of local taxes and intergovernmental transfers. Local 
governments should have a set of taxes over which they control the rates, 
though potentially subject to minimum and maximum rates established by 
the national government. Transfers would continue to provide a significant 
source of revenues. The transfers must be structured such that they 
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 ? Locally elected councils, if they are to enjoy real autonomy, must have 
strong control over a local executive that is subservient to the elected 
council. In Egypt the opposite situation appears to reign. Based on 
experience in other unitary countries this relationship will have to be 
dramatically altered and stood on its head if decentralization is to stand 
any chance of success in Egypt. a locally elected people’s council (LPC) in 
a decentralized world need to be able to set their own budgetary and 
expenditure priorities, within centrally imposed limits, and to have a 
dedicated local executive authority that will prepare budgets on the basis 
of those priorities and submit those budgets for LPC approval and possible 
amendment. By far the easiest method of accomplishing this reform is to 
transfer line Ministry employees currently working at the local level to the 
authority of the LPCS with some powers to define employment conditions 
and salary levels. This is where long experience with deconcentrated 
governance styles can usefully speed up and facilitate the process of 
decentralization by providing an experienced cadre of local experts to 
undertake the task of providing and managing local service delivery. In 
this scenario line ministries themselves would retreat from direct provision 
of local services and would instead concentrate on policy formulation, 
regulation and monitoring of local governments, all proper functions of the 
central government. (EDI and PADCO, 2005), 
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 To deal with the constraint of: “Confused Lines of Authority”: 
? Although Egypt’s Constitution and local government legislation provide 
the room for extensive implementation of the rules and division of 
responsibilities required for decentralization, the laws and executive 
decrees should be reviewed to clarify some aspects and eliminate all areas 
that allow for duplication of authority or for double subordination of lower 
levels of administration. Administrative decentralization not only involves 
the transfer of power from top to bottom, but also changing roles for the 
two levels: the center should withdraw from service delivery and be 
engaged in setting standards and in regulation, while the local level should 
be empowered to carry authority and accountability for actual service 
delivery. The separation of policymaking from purchasing and service 
provision creates clearer channels of accountability. Autonomous 
providers of services have more flexibility in ensuring the appropriate 
input mix. 
? Decisions would need to be made on the assignment of functions between 
the devolved local governments and the central government and 
governorates. Governments would have control over service delivery 
decisions in their assigned areas. One option would be to assign the central 
government activities such as planning, major public works, housing, 
social safety net and other functions that require large capital investments. 
Local governments could deliver others, such as primary and preparatory 
education, water, sewerage, street cleaning and lighting. In their areas of 
responsibility, local governments would have the authority to hire and fire 
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 employees and to set service levels (possibly subject to certain national 
minimum standards). 
To deal with the constraint of “Inadequate local capacities”:   
? All levels of the local hierarchy should enjoy the benefit of training 
alongside the practice of authority. Capacity building should include not 
only the principles of public administration but also those of democratic 
practice, delegation of authority, and responding to local community needs, 
not to specific interest groups. The notion of rewarding competence with 
promotion should replace the practice of promotion by seniority. Capacity 
enhancement could be for both central and local governments: the local 
governments need capacity building to assume responsibility of 
decentralized functions, and central government’s staff need to be trained 
and motivated to change their functions from line management to policy 
formulation (WDR, 2004). Capacity enhancement also includes 
management information systems, and communications and data 
availability issues. Governments must be allowed to build capacity in a 
learning-by-doing manner. It is wrong to delay reform on the basis that 
governments are not fit to grapple with reform of the intergovernmental 
system; rather, they build the capacity as they become intergovernmental. 
The Human Development Report for Egypt (2004) has recommended two 
phases to accomplish decentralization in Egypt. Phase I reforms act as a catalyst 
for Phase II reforms. They mainly included:  
Phase I: 
The cornerstone of a more fiscally decentralized system, Phase I assists 
the government in defining incentives for phase II. It also helps users of the 
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 system to acquire autonomy by making decisions consistent with the provision of 
welfare. Phase I must focus on introducing the following policies: 
1. Enhance Accountability: 
Enhancing accountability will require increased reliance on Governorate-
level HDIs to assist the MOED in determining public investment. A greater 
volume of investments will need to be directed to the Governorates with the 
lowest HDIs. Disbursements should follow a redistributive logic based on 
subsequent changes in the indicators. 
Moreover, Governors should be made aware that their performance will 
be judged according to HDIs. In addition, the right of local councils to interpolate 
the Executive over the choice and implementation of community projects needs to 
be reinstated to give council members incentives to participate in the allocation of 
investments. This will require providing the requisite amounts of training to 
qualify council members for participating in budget negotiations. 
2. Make Budget and Investment Data More Readily Available: 
The availability of reliable data is critical for the allocation of public 
resources to appropriate services required by communities. Increasing the 
transparency of local government finances (with access to investment budgets) 
will allow different actors to discern budgetary incentives, feasibilities and 
constraints. Raising public awareness is expected to raise public demand for 
institutional change gradually. 
3. Encourage Local Government Units to Strengthen their Financial 
Independence: 
The tax collection record of local governments could be improved by 
offering rewards for improvements in their tax collection performance – a scheme 
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 that could be integrated in the MOF’s performance-based budgeting program. 
Legislation permitting Governorates to levy additional taxes, subject to ex-ante 
principles of previous performance should be re-enacted. 
4. Revisit the Process of Public Investment Determination: 
Fiscal decentralization in the determination of investment expenditure 
would only require minimal legislative changes to the current system. As 
illustrated above, the bulk of investment is currently conducted by the central 
government and the Service Authorities. Under the new plan, the MOED would 
continue to function as the agency determining which public investments are 
incorporated in the FYP, but would do so with more stringent and transparent 
guidelines as to the criteria for project selection. 
These requirements would be determined in advance, which would give 
local communities greater incentives to participate in determining their own 
investment priorities at the micro-level.  The MOED’s identification of priority 
projects ultimately would have to follow a Governorate-by- Governorate process. 
In addition, LGUs should be allowed to rely on research institutions and 
universities to implement project evaluations on the basis of accepted economic 
indicators. Cost-benefit principles must be better applied. 
5. Conduct a Comprehensive Evaluation of Special Accounts and 
Funds: 
Actors should try to evaluate the successes and failures of these accounts. 
While their significance in terms of the volume of revenue is negligible, they are 
potentially the foundation for a rules-based process of fiscal decentralization. 
Phase II 
The second phase is characterized by the introduction of a comprehensive 
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 market-based system with rules that guide public investments and encourage the 
participation of independent parties. Regulations would cover the processes of 
identifying service needs, evaluating their costs and benefits, managing these 
services, and monitoring their operation. The accumulated body of knowledge 
that both policy-makers and participants gain from the first phase will allow them 
to agree on a set of critical parameters to be included as ‘rules’ in the newly 
decentralized system of decision-making. 
The second phase envisions the following: 
1. Elected Popular Councils Play a Central Role in Local Public 
Choices: 
The crux of fiscal decentralization is the accountability of public sector 
decision-makers toward their constituencies. Elected Popular Councils should 
receive the right to monitor the performance of government officials and report 
their activities to back to their constituencies. 
2. Civil Service Reform: 
It is likely that the current levels of civil service employment at 
standardized wages will continue to remain in place. However, once institutional 
and human capacity infrastructures are established, civil service reform will need 
to hold public servants accountable for the provision of public services. It must 
also address imbalances in Ministries where the share of administrative positions 
outweighs that of professionals, such as doctors or teachers. 
3. Ministers are Responsible for Setting Sector policies: 
LGUs should receive the authority to implement investment projects. 
Ministries would be required to formulate policy priorities and means of 
translating these into the expenditure of local revenue. The Ministries’ policy 
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 guidelines could serve as yardsticks that determine which LGU would receive 
central government subsidies as a reward for complying with policy objectives 
and adhering to the Ministries’ procedural guidelines for meeting these objectives. 
4. Fiscal Responsibility Law: 
The proposed law would lay down investment measures and subsidization 
principles while eliminating the possibility of bailout in cases that do not meet ex-
ante principles. The principle of fiscal neutrality does not necessarily mean that 
LGUs would be expected to break even; they could start confronting a financial 
constraint not exceeding the level of their governance budget deficit through a 
gradual reduction in their dependence on central government transfers.  
In conclusion, if no power is devolved, no decision would be made, that if 
jurisdictions are not clearly delimited, nothing would be targeted, and that if local 
resources are not devoted for local units, no action would be undertaken. As a 
proverb: “No political volition, no fiscal decentralization, no delimited functions, 
and no authority”. (Ghanem, 2002). 
A final point that is obvious but nevertheless worth putting on the record: 
decentralization can be done well or done badly. Done well, it can lead to the 
benefits promised by a well functioning intergovernmental system: enhanced 
macroeconomic performance, better local services (such as primary education, 
clean water, and access to health, justice, community public safety, and 
transportation) and, for some countries, enhanced national cohesion. But, if 
decentralization is done badly, it can lead to a macroeconomic mess, neglect of 
the needs of local citizenry (and especially the poor), corruption, collapse of the 
safety net, and social tension (Amin, K. and Ebel, R., 2006). 
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 Conclusion: 
Decentralization is a widely used approach to manage local public 
investment. It has proven its success in many countries. Decentralization, however, 
is not a goal in itself; instead, it is a tool to achieve societal developmental 
objectives through the efficient use of local units’ resources and abilities. It is a 
mean through which local communities can fulfill their needs within the general 
framework of public policies.  
Before developing a plan for decentralization, it is a must to assess the 
lowest organizational level of government at which investment management 
functions can be carried out efficiently and effectively. It is also necessary to 
carefully analyze the types of decentralization already present in a country in 
order to tailor policy plans to the existing structures. 
In a decentralized system, investment planning and financing must be 
enhanced. Planning functions should be decentralized in certain ways such as 
having a vertically linked deconcentrated planning system within each sectoral 
ministry or a system which devolves particular planning responsibilities to local 
governments, perhaps with technical support provided by sectoral ministries. On 
the other hand, the financial position of local authorities must be strengthened 
through reforming the finance system to increase their sources of revenue. If they 
had more income, they would have more scope to perform voluntary self-
administration tasks. Unless local authorities have the freedom to control their 
revenue, they will never have sufficient funds to make appropriate choices on new 
capital spending or investment projects. At the same time, local authorities should 
receive both the financial and technical help they need in managing local public 
investment from central government and the private sector. In addition, local 
 77
 officials must be well-trained to carry out the newly assigned responsibilities and 
functions after decentralization. 
After all, the logic behind decentralization is not about weakening the 
central authority, nor is it about preferring local elites to central authority, but it is 
fundamentally about making governance at the local level more responsive to the 
felt needs of the large majority of the population (Bardhan, P., 2002).  
As for Egypt, the stress upon applying decentralization in managing local 
investment is an ongoing trend that appears frequently in the speeches of political 
representatives. The gradual approach is the most preferred and recommended by 
scholars for Egypt. To do that, Egypt has to consider the necessary factors for the 
success of decentralization: decentralization efforts depend on the presence of a 
clear vision regarding the position and functions of local governments and on a 
strong political will to implement that vision. It also depends on the willingness of 
both the central and the local level to see each other as partners- not competitors- 
in an ongoing process.  
Without a strong legal framework clearly setting out the powers, rights, 
and duties of local governments, it is often impossible to know who is responsible 
for what. This allows central authorities to interfere easily with local affairs. A 
strong legal framework to support decentralization efforts is required for Egypt. 
The success also depends to a very large extent on the availability of 
sufficient resources to local government to invest and the possibility of using 
these resources autonomously. They should also have the right of to spend this 
money without excessive prior control by central authorities. They should also 
have the right to take decisions on local projects without undue interference by 
national planning authorities and line ministries.  
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 Transparency of governmental actions and the possibility to access 
relevant information such as budgets, plans, etc. and transparency in the relations 
between local governments and the supervising authorities is a must for the 
success of decentralization efforts.  
Training of local officials and providing them with the necessary 
technical assistance is one of main requirement on the side of central government. 
Without the availability of effective local capacity to run the different 
management functions of local investment, decentralization efforts can be 
doomed to failure 
Decentralization leads to the promising benefits if it is done well. 
Therefore, Egypt has to develop a decentralization strategy that fits with its own 
conditions and achieves the intended goals. 
Finally, it is worth noting that centralization and decentralization are not 
"either-or" conditions. In most countries an appropriate balance of centralization 
and decentralization is essential to the effective and efficient management of local 
investment. Not all functions can or should be financed and managed in a 
decentralized fashion. Even when national governments decentralize 
responsibilities, they often retain important policy and supervisory roles. Central 
ministries often have crucial roles in promoting and sustaining decentralization by 
developing appropriate and effective national policies and regulations for 
decentralization and strengthening local institutional capacity to assume 
responsibility for new functions.  
 
 
 
 79
 Bibilography: 
Abd.Elhameed, Samir and Farid Ahmed. (2006). Decentralized planning 
in the Egyptian governorates, in Elsayed Ghanem (editor), Decentralization and 
locality issues program no.6. Public Administration Research and Consultation 
Center, Cairo University. 
 
Amin, Khaled Z., and Robert Ebel. (2006). Intergovernmental Relations 
and Fiscal Decentralization. Egypt Public Expenditure Review. Note 8. 
Washington D.C.:World Bank. 
 
Amin, Khaled Z., (2005). Fiscal Decentralization and Poverty: A Cross-
Sectional Analysis with A Case Study of Egypt. Ph.D. dissertation, New York 
University. 
 
Andrews, Matthew and Larry Schroeder. (2003). Sectoral 
Decentralization and Intergovernmental Arrangements in Africa. Public 
Administration and Development. 23(1): 29–40, John Wiley & Son, Ltd.  
 
Bach, Stefan and Dieter Vesper. (2002). A Crisis in Finance and 
Investment – Local Government Finance Needs Fundamental Reform. Economic 
bulletin. vol.39 no.9, pp.309-316.  Berlin Heidelberg: Die Wirtschaftsforschung.   
 
Bardhan, Pranab. (2002). Decentralization of Governance and 
Development. Journal of Economic Perspectives. American Economic Association. 
vol. 16(4), pages 185-205. 
 
Clark, Greg and Debra Mountford. (2007). Investment Strategies and 
Financial Tools For Local Development. Local Economic and Employment 
Development. Paris: OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development).  
 
Cohen, John M. and Stephen B. Peterson. (1999). Administrative 
Decentralization: strategies for developing countries. West Hartford. CT: 
Kumarian Press.  
 
Conyers, Diana, and Peter Hills. (1984). AnIntroduction to Development 
Planning in the Third World. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.  
 
Ebel, Robert D. and Serdar Yilmaz. (2003). On the Measurement and 
 80
 Impact of Fiscal Decentralization. In James Alm and Jorge Martinez- Vasquez, 
eds.. Public Finance in Developing and Transitional Countries: Essays in Honor of 
Richard M. Bird. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar Press.  
 
EDI and PADCO (Egyptian Decentralization Initiative, Planning and 
Development Collaborative International,) What kind of decentralization for 
Egypt, Cairo ( 2005). 
 
El Sawy, Ali. (2002). Governors without Governance: Constitutional, 
Legal and Administrative Frameworks of Local Governments in Egypt. Paper 
presented to Mediterranean Development Forum (MDF) No. 4. 
 
El-Saharty, Sameh, Gail Richardson, and Susan Chase, (2005). Egypt and 
the Millennium Development Goals: Challenges and Opportunities. Health, 
Nutrition and Population Discussion Paper. Washington D.C.: World Bank, 
February. 
 
Faguet, Jean-Paul. (2002). The Determinants of Central vs. Local 
Government Investment: Institutions and Politics Matter. Development Studies 
Institute. London: School Of Economics, Working Paper series 02-38. 
 
Fisher, Ronald C. (1987). State and Local Public Finance. Scott, Foreman 
and Company, Glenview Illinois. 
 
Fox, William F., and El Sayed Ghanem. (1998). Decentralization in 
Egypt: the First Steps have been Taken. working paper. University of Tennessee 
and Cairo University. 
 
Ghanem, El Sayed. (2002). Fiscal decentralization in Egypt. paper 
presented to the Beirut22nd-23rd January: Conference of Empowering Local 
Government Institutions in the MENA Region. 
 
Honadle, George and David Gow, (1981), Putting the Cart behind the 
Horse: Participation, Decentralization, and Capacity Building for Rural 
Development, Washington, D.C.: Development Alternatives.  
 
Hope, Kempe Ronald. (2000). Decentralization and Local Governance 
Theory and the Practice in Botswana. Development Southern Africa. Vol 17. No.4, 
October. 
 
 81
 Joumard, Isabelle and Per Mathis Kongsrud. (2003). Fiscal Relations 
Across Government Levels. Economic Department working paper no.375. Paris: 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  
 
Kälin, Walter, (1997). Decentralization - Why and How? World Bank 
Institute, Washington DC.: World Bank and Swiss Development Cooperation: 
Closed Expert Workshop 
 
Litvack, Jennie, and Jessica Seddon. (1999). Decentralization Briefing 
Notes, World Bank Institute Working Papers. Washington D.C.:World Bank. 
 
Litvack, Jennie, Junaid Ahmed, and Richard Bird. (1998). Rethinking 
Decentralization in Developing Countries. World Bank. Sector Studies Series. 
Washington D.C.: World Bank.  
 
Magnussen, Jon, Terje P. Hagen. and Oddvar M. Kaarboe. (2007). 
Centralized or Decentralized? A Case Study of Norwegian Hospital Reform. 
Social Science & Medicine, 64 (10), 2129-2137. 
 
Murphy, Richard. (2005). Paying for Local Investment: New Finance 
Mechanisms for Local Government. England: New Economics Foundation and 
Policy Exchange.  
 
Richard, Bird M. and Robert D. Ebel. (2006). Forthcoming, Fiscal 
Federalism and National Unity. In Ehtisham Ahmad and Georgio Brosio, eds., 
International Handbook on Federalism. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Edgar Press.  
 
Rondinelli, Dennis A. and John R. Nellis .(1986). Assessing 
Decentralization Policies: a Case for Cautious Optimism. Development Policy 
Review 4(1).  
 
Rosen, H.S. and Ted Gayer. (2008). Public Finance, 8th edition. New 
York: McGraw-Hill Irwin. 
 
Shand, David .(2005). Budget construction and decentralization. Egypt 
Public Expenditure Review, Note 6. Washington, DC.: World Bank. 
 
Silverman, Jerry M. (1992). Public Sector Decentralization: Economic 
Policy and Sector Investment Programs. World Bank Technical Paper no. 188. 
Washington D.C.: World Bank.  
 82
  83
 
Sundaram, K.V. (1997). Decentralized Multilevel Planning: Principles 
and Practice. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company. 
 
UNDP/INP (United Nations Development Program/Institute of National 
Planning, Egypt). (2004). Choosing Decentralization for Good Governance. 
Egypt Human Development Report 2004. New York: UNDP. 
 
Vavouras, Ioannis S. (1986). Local Government Investment Planning: A 
Proposed Approach Applied to Greece. Comparative Economic Studies. vol. 28, 
iss. 4, pp. 1-11 
 
Vito Tanzi. (2001). Pitfalls on the Road to Fiscal Decentralization. 
Working Papers. Carnegie: Endowment for International Peace. No. 19. 
 
Weisner, Eduardo. (2003). An Approach Paper to Decentralization in 
Egypt: The Qena Experience. draft final report. New York: UNDP. 
 
World Bank. (2004). Arab Republic of Egypt: A Poverty Reduction 
Strategy for Egypt. Report No. 27954-EGT. 
 
World Development Report (WDR). (2004). Making Services Work for 
Poor People. Washington, D. C.: World Bank.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
